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Abstract 
 
The first essay examines the impact of investor protection, market monitoring, and 
liquidity on the firm-level and country-level earnings management using a sample of 432 firms 
from 34 countries cross-listed in the U.S. The major findings are as follows: First, cross-listed 
firms from countries with strong legal system, strong outside investor rights, more institutional 
investors, and higher financial transparency are less likely to engage in earnings management. In 
addition, in countries with strong investor protection or market monitoring, the level of earnings 
management is more pronounced for illiquid firms as compared to liquid firms. Second, cross-
listed firms following IFRS have lower propensity in earnings management than those following 
the U.S. GAAP. Third, the degree of earnings management for cross-listed firms is greater in the 
home country than in the U.S. market. Fourth, cross-listed firms have higher earnings 
management in the pre-listing period than in the post-listing period. Fifth, foreign firms listed in 
U.S. major markets have lower propensity to engage in earnings management than those listed in 
the OTC market. The findings remain robust with the inclusion of industry fixed effects and 
GMM estimation. All findings are largely consistent with my hypotheses that better investor 
protection, greater market monitoring, and higher liquidity reduce the extent of earnings 
management.  
The second essay examines the relative contribution to price discovery process of 
EURO/USD currency futures traded on two major exchanges: Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME) and Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), using the intraday data in 2010.  The relative 
contribution to price discovery is estimated using the information share approach of Hasbrouck 
(1995).  Empirical findings indicate that CME accounts for approximately 87% of price 
discovery in the EURO/USD market and its contribution is substantially larger in the morning 
x 
 
than that in the afternoon.  This study also examines the effect of trading characteristics, 
including volume, quoted bid-ask spread, and price volatility, on information share. CME’s price 
discovery leadership is attributed to its high trading activity, low transaction costs, and lower 
volatility. The results support the liquidity hypothesis that a market with greater liquidity 
contributes more to price discovery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Earnings Management, Market Monitoring, Cross-listed Firms, Information Share, 
Liquidity  
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1. Introduction 
Earnings management refers to the manipulation of earnings by corporate managers, 
motivated by either managerial self-interests or by financing needs.1  Several studies suggest that 
earnings management can be mitigated by a country’s strong legal protection of investors. More 
specifically, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), Shen and Chih (2007), Nabar and Boonlert-U-
Thai (2007), Cahan, Liu, and Sun (2008), and Chin, Chen, and Hsieh (2009) compare the extent 
of earnings management across countries and generally find that countries with stronger degrees 
of legal protection tend to be associated with lesser degrees of earnings management. This paper 
extends the studies in three ways, as discussed below. 
First, the study restricts the sample firms to international firms cross-listed in the U.S.2 
The advantage of analysing cross-listed firms is that cross-listed firms represent a more 
homogeneous group and a cleaner sample. This is so because they are likely larger, 
                                                          
1
 Studies generally view that earnings management is motivated by capital market motivations (Cotton, 
2008; Perry and Williams, 1994; DeAngelo, 1988) or contracting motivations (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; 
Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). For heavily regulated industries, regulatory 
motivations are also important (Beatty et al. 1995; Collins et al., 1995). Managers have incentives to 
deviate shareholder’s interests to control more private benefits. The contracting hypothesis argues that 
when managers have more discretionary powers to control private benefits, managers are more likely 
tongage in managing earnings. Cheng and Warfield (2005), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), and Baker, 
Collins, and Reitenga (2003) document a relation between earnings management and equity-incentives: 
that managers are more likely to engage in earnings management when their compensation is stock- or 
option-based. This implies that managers manage reported earnings not only to control private benefits 
but also to communicate incorrect information on firm performance to stakeholders. Specifically, 
managers will reveal favorable performance but conceal unfavorable performance from stakeholders 
through their accounting discretion.  
2
 Foreign firms can be listed in US major stock exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX) or in the over-
the-counter (OTC), and stocks traded in the OTC are subject to a lesser degree of regulation. Hence, it is 
hypothesized that earnings management tends to be greater for stocks traded in OTC. However, this test is 
doable only if data for a sufficient number of OTC stocks is available. These cross-listed shares are also 
called American Depository Receipts (ADRs), classified into four categories. Level 1 share can only be 
traded on the OTC market. Level 1 does not require full SEC registration and the company does not have 
to report its accounts under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or provide full 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure. Level 2 shares must file a registration statement 
with the SEC and is subject to SEC regulation. Level 3 shares have the same features as level 2 except 
that Level 3 can issue shares to raise capital. Level 4 stocks operate under Rule 144A and Regulation S 
without SEC regulation. Only Levels 2 and 3 can be listed on U.S. stock exchanges, such as NYSE, 
NASDAQ, and AMEX, and are regulated by the SEC.  
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internationally known, have less information asymmetry, and face similar accounting standards 
and liquidity for their shares listed in the U.S. This cleaner sample might produce cleaner results. 
Leuz et al. (2003) acknowledge potential problems in their study such as different accounting 
standards in different countries. The problem of different accounting standards is non-existing 
for cross-listed shares that need to follow the US listing and accounting standards to be listed. 
Moreover, some studies have documented wide cross-country variations in terms of information 
asymmetry (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Jin and Myers, 2006), market liquidity (Lesmond, 
2005), accounting standards (Speidell and Bavishi, 1992), degree of investor protection (Dyck 
and Zingales, 2004; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008), and concentration 
of firm size. For instance, Speidell and Bavishi (1992) study the 900 largest global companies, 
and conclude that differences in accounting standards can result in considerable differences in 
earnings.3 Lesmond (2005) shows large cross-country variations in bid-ask spreads; for instance 
the bid-ask spread averages 1% in Taiwan and 47% for the Russian market. Furthermore, 
information asymmetry around the world’s equity markets can be partially explained by the 
differences of insider trading laws and enforcement (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002).    
Second, in addition to legal protection, this study also examines whether the extent of 
institutional holdings, number of financial analysts, the degree of audit quality, and stock  
liquidity can affect earnings management. The rationale to include these is that it is reasonable to 
expect that managers might be more (less) hesitant to practice earnings management when 
outside monitoring is strong (weak). As suggested by Ferreira and Matos (2008), institutional 
investors prefer to invest in firms or countries with strong corporate governance. A country with 
high percentage of institutional holdings indicates increased governance of firm management. 
                                                          
3
 For example, after the adjustment to the international standard, the net change in income increases by 
60% and 40%, respectively, for Sweden and Germany companies.   
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The number of analysts is a proxy for the amount of private information acquired by financial 
analysts because financial analysts specialize in interpreting firms’ financial reports and 
collecting information from stakeholders. Audit quality is a measure of the credibility of 
financial disclosures (Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2004). Enhanced audit quality or more 
number of analysts indicates higher financial transparency. High equity market liquidity implies 
that more investors participate in the market. A firm or country with high liquidity has more 
investors to monitor its performance. Since greater institutional holdings, the number of analysts 
following, audit quality, and liquidity typically reflect greater capital market monitoring, I 
incorporate these four factors in the analysis. It should be emphasized that legal protection and 
market monitoring is not necessarily correlated. For example, Switzerland and Finland are under 
the civil law which tends to be associated with weak legal investor rights but their degree of 
market development is high (La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2008).4 The hypothesis here is 
that firms in countries with strongest investor protection, market development, institutional 
holdings, financial transparency, and high liquidity are less likely to practice earnings 
management. 
Third, firms often follow either International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or 
U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The former is a “principle-based” 
approach so it emphasizes that the accounting disclosures fairly represent the company’s 
financial position. For instance, IFRS requires firms to recognize losses in a timely manner. The 
latter is a “rule-based” approach and therefore emphasizes regulatory compliance. Overall, IFRS 
requires publicly traded companies to reveal their accounting information to investors in a 
                                                          
4
 Legal aspect alone might not completely explain cross-country variations in earnings management.  
Since legal system rarely changes, it is difficult to explain variations of earnings management across firms 
in the same country. 
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correct and efficient manner. It is reasonable to expect that firms from countries that follow IFRS 
are less likely engaged in earnings management. However, Holthausen (2009) argues that even if 
all countries follow the same accounting standards, the financial reporting outcomes across 
countries would not be similar unless the institutional, economic, and regulatory forces that 
govern the quality of financial reporting become similar as well. Thus, legal system, market 
monitoring, or accounting standards alone would not be sufficient to discourage manipulation of 
accounting reports. All these three forces are important to explain variations in earnings 
management across firms and across countries. 
Fourth, cross-listed firms produce financial statements for both their home countries and 
the U.S. market. I compare statements from the same set of firms across countries. As indicated 
by Ferreiira and Matos (2008), institutional ownership in the U.S. accounts for 65.7 percent per 
market capitalization, which is the highest among 27 countries. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) 
conclude that foreign firms cross-list shares in the U.S. partly because of strong investor 
protection. Therefore, U.S. is likely the country where the combined level of investor protection, 
market development, and institutional holdings is the strongest. I hypothesize that the degree of 
earnings management is less for statements reported in the U.S. 
As a summary, the empirical evidence indicates the following: First, cross-listed 
companies from the countries with weak legal protection, institutional monitoring, financial 
transparency, and lower liquidity are more likely to engage in earnings management. Second, in 
countries with strong investor protection and market monitoring, illiquid cross-listed firms are 
less hesitant to engage in earnings management than liquid ones. Third, cross-listed firms using 
IFRS accounting standards have lower level of earnings management than those using 
U.S.GAAP. Fourth, the degree of earnings management for cross-listed firms is greater in the 
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home country than in the U.S. Fifth, cross-listed firms have higher earnings management in the 
pre-listing period than in the post-listing period. Last, foreign firms cross-listing shares in U.S. 
major stock markets have lower propensity to engage in earnings management than those firms 
cross-listed in the over-the-counter (OTC) market. Some additional tests that are more limited in 
scope include a pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis; these are more limited in scope 
because earnings reports are low-frequency data, hence not well-suited for time series analysis. 
This study is also related to Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006), who compare earnings 
management between cross-listed firms and U.S. firms. They find that cross-listed firms tend to 
be more associated with earnings management than U.S. firms. Since U.S. firms and ADRs are 
subject to the same regulation, this finding implies that factors other than regulation affect the 
extent of earnings management, and it is hypothesized here that outside monitoring and market 
development are some of those other factors. While Lang et al. also analyze cross-listed firms, 
they primarily investigate the difference between US firms and ADRs. That is, their study does 
not directly compare cross-listed firms with strong and weak investor protections. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews literature regarding 
investor protection and earnings management. Section 3 describes the data, hypotheses, and the 
methodology. Section 4 discusses empirical results, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Earnings Management and Investor Protection 
In a seminal paper, La Porta et al. (1998) find that the degree of investor protection is 
associated with the country’s legal system, country development, and ownership concentration. 
Weak investor protection can provide managers more discretion in earnings reporting and more 
opportunities in acquiring private benefits. The relation between earnings management and 
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investor protection has been studied by Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), Shen and Chih (2007), 
Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007), Cahan, Liu, and Sun (2008), and Chin, Chen, and Hsieh 
(2009). These studies are described next.  
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) investigate 31 countries over the period of 1990 to 
1999. They separate the countries into three categories: insider economies with weak legal 
system, insider economies with strong legal system, and outsider economies with strong legal 
system. The aggregate earnings management index is constructed by both earning smoothing and 
earning discretion measures. The results show that minority investor protection and legal 
enforcement have significant effects on earnings management. In particular, outsider economies 
with strong investor protection lower the level of earnings management. Shen and Chih (2007) 
analyze the relation between corporate governance and earnings management in Asian Emerging 
markets from April 2001 to February 2002. They employ corporate governance index that covers 
seven categories: management discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, 
responsibility, fairness, and social awareness. The results indicate a negative relation between 
corporate governance and earnings management; that is, good corporate governance can mitigate 
the degree of earnings management. Also, strong anti-director rights are negatively associated 
with earnings management, which is consistent with Leuz et al. (2003). Finally, they find that 
large firms or growth firms are prone to engage in earnings management.  
Several other studies also look at earnings management across countries, although with a 
different focus. Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007) study the impact of investor protection and 
culture on earnings management. Using a sample of firms in Taiwan, Chin, Chen, and Hsieh 
(2009) document a positive relation between corporate international exposure and earnings 
management. The level of earnings management tends to be less if a firm has assets in countries 
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practicing common law or countries with high investor protection. Cahan, Liu, and Sun (2008) 
study 44 countries over the period of 1993 to 2002. Similar to previous evidence, they find that 
firms operating in countries with weak investor protection engage more in earnings smoothing; 
in addition, they find that firms in countries with strong investor protection are aimed to convey 
private information about future earnings.  
 
2.2 Cross-listing and Investor Protection 
Several studies including those of Coffee (1999), Stulz (1999), Black (2001), Abdallah 
and Goergen (2008), and Roosenboom and Dijk (2009) hypothesize a bonding effect by cross-
listing: foreign firms, especially firms from countries with weak investor protection, choose to 
cross-list their shares in countries with higher investor protection standard to enhance minority 
shareholders rights. Supposedly, cross-listed firms on U.S. major exchanges are subject to 
stringent U.S. laws and SEC regulations, and therefore under strong corporate governance.5 
Roosenboom and Dijk (2009) analyze valuation effects of cross-listing using a sample of 526 
cross-listings from 44 different countries on eight major stock exchanges. Cross-listing on US 
exchanges generate a relatively high average return of 1.3% around the announcement date 
comparing to cross-listing on London Stock Exchange, continental Europe, and Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. Greater value creation by cross-listing on U.S. exchanges can be explained by better 
                                                          
5
 There still exist a controversy that whether U.S. regulations indeed improve corporate governance of 
cross-listed firms. In practice, reputation bonding is more pronounced than regulatory bonding as 
documented by Siegel (2005), Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006), and Burns, Francis, and Hasan (2007). 
Siegel (2005) find that the SEC regulations have not effectively enforced on cross-listed firms. Burns, 
Francis, and Hasan (2007) argue that the importance of regulatory bonding is more limited than expected. 
Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006) show that under SEC regulation, cross-listed firms from countries with 
weak investor protection still exhibit higher earnings management than the matched U.S. firms. This 
implies that the bonding mechanism is not strongly effective. Further, Abdalah and Ioannidis (2010) 
study the motivation of cross-listing in US using the sample of 1165 cross-listed firms from 47 countries 
over the period of 1976-2007.  Evidence does not support the investor protection hypothesis. 
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investor protection and improved information disclosure. The degree of investor protection might 
depend on the destination market. Pagano, Randl, Röell, and Zechner (2001) find European firms 
have the propensity to cross-list in U.S. due to better investor protection, efficient courts and 
bureaucracy.  
O’Connor (2006) uses the change in dividend payout as a proxy for corporate governance. 
He finds that the dividend payout is negatively associated with the level of investor protection. 
Investors of cross-listed firms on U.S/ major exchanges are better protected and receive lower 
ordinary dividend payout than investors of cross-listed firms on OTC or Rule 144a. Conversely, 
investors of cross-listed firms on OTC or Rule 144a receive sizable dividend as compensation for 
weak governance.   
 
2.3 Accounting Standards 
La Porta et al. (1998) contend that accounting standard is a complement of investor 
protection. The greater the ability to provide protection to minority investors, the less discretion 
in accounting managers can exercise. The Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research rate the quality of accounting standards based on general information, income 
statement, balance sheet, cash flow statement, accounting standards, stock data, and special items. 
Countries with better accounting standards have dispersed ownership and thereby better investor 
protection. It implies that high quality of accounting standards effectively lowers the degree of 
earnings management. Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) find significant improvement of 
accounting quality in the pre- and post- the adoption of International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
in 21 countries.6 IAS firms have higher accounting quality and thereby exhibit less earnings 
                                                          
6
 International Accounting Standards (IAS) is the former name of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). 
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management than non-IAS firms. Moreover, Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006) find even though 
cross-listed firms on U.S. major exchanges fully comply with the U.S. GAAP, these firms 
engage in earnings management in a greater degree than comparable US firms. That is, even 
under the same accounting standards, the degree of earnings management is still dependent on 
firms’ originality.  
The effectiveness of IFRS on the quality of accounting reports and more precisely on 
earnings management is not entirely clear because the adoption of IFRS around the world is still 
in progress as shown in Appendix A. Several studies including Chen, Tang, Jiang, and Lin 
(2010), Iatridis (2010), and Zhou, Xiong, and Ganguli (2009) find evidence that the adoption of 
IFRS reduces the scope of earnings management. Chen, Tang, Jiang, and Lin (2010) investigate 
the improvement of accounting quality during the pre- and post-adoption of IFRS for all publicly 
traded firms in fifteen states of the European Union. After controlling for firm characteristics, the 
quality improvement is primarily attributed to IFRS. Zhou, Xiong, and Ganguli (2009) compare 
the degree of earnings management for the adopting IFRS firms and non-adopting IFRS firms. 
They conclude that IFRS-adopting firms are less likely to engage in smoothing earnings mainly 
due to the requirement of loss recognition in a timely manner. The increase of the quality of 
accounting information improves transparency. However, other papers related to IFRS and 
earnings management have the opposite arguments. Jeanijean and Stolowy (2008) examine the 
first IFRS adopter countries, including Australia, France, and United Kingdom, contending that 
earnings management remains pervasive, especially France. Management incentives and 
institutional factors play important roles in financial reporting as well. Van tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005) examine the differences of German GAAP and IFRS, concluding that IFRS 
adopters are not associated with lower earnings management in Germany. Therefore, high 
10 
 
quality accounting standards serve as a necessary condition for high quality information, but not 
a sufficient condition. This is consistent with the findings of Ball et al. (2003) and Pagano, Randl, 
Roell, and Zechner (2001).  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1Sample and Data Sources 
The sample consists of cross-listed firms in U.S. major stock markets (NYSE, NASDAQ, 
and AMEX) and over-the-counter market during the period of 2000-2009. The cross-listed firm 
names, stock ticker and CUSIP, ratio of ADR to ordinary share, listed exchange and level, region, 
industry, originality, underlying stock exchange, depositary bank, and effective date are obtained 
from the ADR universe on www.adr.com. The sample of cross-listed firms is cross-checked with 
depositary banks, such as Banks of New York Mellon, Citibank, J.P. Morgan Chase, 
Computershare Trust Co. of New York, Deutsche Bank, as well as the Compustat. 
The financial data is from the Compustat North America and Compustat Global. Firms in 
financial services industry (SIC code: 6000s) and in utility industry (SIC between 4400 and 5000) 
are excluded from the sample. Firms with government ownership are excluded as well. To be 
included in the sample, each firm must have financial statements for at least three consecutive 
years. In this study, the total number of cross-listed firms is 432 from 34 countries. Legal origin, 
legal enforcement indices, and importance of equity market are taken from La Porta et al. (1998). 
Outside investor rights index is obtained from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2008). Country average institutional holdings data is available from Ferreira and Matos (2008). 
The number of financial analysts and the degree of audit quality are obtained from Bushman, 
Piotroski, and Smith (2004). Appendix B shows the ADRs come from 34 countries with great 
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variations in terms of the legal systems, institutional holdings, the number of analysts following, 
and audit quality. The adopted Accounting Standards across countries are from Compustat 
Global. Daily return data are from Compustat Global Security daily.  
 
3.2Measures of Earnings Management 
Measures of earnings management follow that of Leuz et al. (2003) and Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997): 1) the ratio of standard deviation of operating earnings and standard deviation of 
cash flow from operations; 2) the Spearman correlation between changes in accruals and changes 
in operating cash flow; 3) the absolute value of firms’ accruals scaled by cash flow from 
operations. More details of these measures are given next. 
The first earnings management measure is notated as EM1, a measure of earnings 
smoothing. This measure is a ratio of the firm-level standard deviation of operating earnings and 
the firm-level standard deviation of cash flow from operations. 
Cash flow from operations = operating earnings – accruals(eq.1) 
Accruals it = (∆CA it - ∆Cash it) – (∆CL it - ∆STD it - ∆TP it) - Dep it  (eq. 2) 
where∆CA
 it = changes in current assets at time t for the ith firm 
∆Cash
 it = changes in cash at time t for the ith firm  
∆CL
 it = changes in current liabilities at time t for the ith firm 
∆STD
 it = changes in short-term debt at time t for the ith firm 
∆TP
 it = changes in income taxes payable at time t for the ith firm 
Dep
 it = depreciation and amortization expense at time t for the ith firm 
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Second, managers can conceal firm performance from stakeholders using accounting discretion 
in two ways: understating the reported earnings by increasing accruals or overstating the reported 
earnings by decreasing accruals. Either case creates a negative correlation between changes in 
accruals and changes in operating cash flows. The second measure of earnings management, 
EM2, is the Spearman correlation between changes in accruals and changes in operating cash 
flow. The higher the magnitude of correlation indicates less of earnings management. The third 
measure is denoted EM3; it measures the magnitude of accruals, computed as the absolute value 
of firms’ accruals. This measure is scaled by the absolute value of cash flow from operations. 
The aggregate index of earnings management is constructed by the above three measures. 
Specifically, each firm is first ranked from high to low level of earnings management for each of 
three measures. Then, the aggregate earnings management index is calculated by the average of 
the firm rankings under the three measures. EM1 and EM2 are associated with earnings 
smoothing while EM3 is associated with earnings discretion. 
 
3.3 Measures for Investor Protection and Market Monitoring 
In Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), investor protection is ranked by the following six 
categories: legal origin, legal enforcement, outside investor rights, importance of equity market, 
ownership concentration, and disclosure index. Each component of investor protection is 
described in La Porta et al. (1998) and Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003). Legal origins include 
common-law, civil-law, Scandinavian, and German-civil-law countries. Legal enforcement 
includes efficiency of judicial system, the assessment of rule of law, and the corruption index. 
Outside investor rights refers to the anti-director rights index, composed by proxy by mail 
allowed, shares not blocked before meeting, cumulative voting, oppressed minority, preemptive 
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right to new issues, and percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting. 
The importance of equity market includes the ratio of the aggregate stock market capitalization 
held by minorities to gross national product, the number of listed domestic firms relative to the 
population, the number of IPOs relative to the population. 
To measure the extent of market monitoring, I include institutional holdings, number of 
analysts, and audit quality in the analysis. Accounting standards (IFRS/GAAP) is also used as a 
proxy for market monitoring because it can be served as a measure of financial transparency.     
 
3.4 Hypotheses and Methodology 
The following hypotheses are tested: 
 
H1: Cross-listed companies from the countries with weak legal protection, market development, 
institutional monitoring, and analyst following, are more likely to engage in earnings 
management.  
 
H2: In a country with strong investor protection or strong market monitoring, illiquid cross-listed 
companies are more likely to engage in earnings management than liquid one.  
 
H3: Cross-listed firms using IFRS accounting standards have lower level of earnings 
management than cross-listed firms using U.S.GAAP. 
 
H4: The degree of earnings management for cross-listed firms is greater in the home country 
than in the U.S. 
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In addition, it is reasonable to expect that firms will be more hesitate to practice earnings 
management after listing in the US. Therefore: 
 
H5: Cross-listed firms have higher earnings management in the pre-listing period than in the 
post-listing period. 
 
H6: Foreign firms cross-listing shares in U.S. major stock markets have lower propensity to 
engage in earnings management than those listed in the OTC market. 
 
A cross-sectional regression analysis is used to test the above hypotheses. The dependent 
variable is the firm-level aggregate earnings management index (AggEM). Country-level 
explanatory variables consist of legal origin (origin), outside investor rights (outsider), 
importance of equity market (equ), institutional holdings (inst), disclosure (dis), the number of 
analysts (ana), and audit quality (aud). Firm-level explanatory variables consist of stock liquidity, 
measured by the inverse of Amihud liquidity ratio (liq). The Amihud illiquidity ratio is derived 
by Amihud (2002) and defined as the absolute (percentage) price change per dollar of annual 
trading volume. Also included are three dummy variables for accounting standards (IFRS/GAAP 
= 0 for GAAP and 1 for IFRS), whether the stock is traded in U.S. market (us =1 for U.S. market 
and 0 for home country), and whether the stock is traded in a U.S. major exchange (exch =1 if 
traded in a major stock market and 0 if traded in OTC).  To control for firm characteristics, 
market-to-book ratio (mb), total assets (at), and debt to equity ratio (dr) are included. To check 
for robustness, only one of multiple variables of similar nature (e.g., legal origin and outside 
right) is used in alternative regression specifications. Table 1 provides further details of the 
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variables and their predicted signs based on my hypotheses. The regression, when all variables 
are included, is stated as follows. 
  ,	 
 ,	 
 ,	 
 ,	 
 ,	 
 ,	 
  

 !"/$% 
 &'( 
 & 
 ) 
 ,	     (eq.3) 
 
where  stands for the *+ firm in the ,*+ country and  is the error term. 
 
The above regression is purely cross-sectional, mainly because many variables such as legal 
system seldom underwent a major change. For robustness check, the country-level cross-
sectional regression analysis will be presented later.    
As an alternative specification, investor protection index is transformed into a dummy 
that takes the value of 1 for above-average investor protection and 0 otherwise. Each market 
monitoring variable likewise is transformed in to dummy with value = 1 for strong market 
monitoring and 0 otherwise. Specifically, the set of dummy variables includes -_ , 
-_, -_, -_, and -_ for legal origin, outside investor rights, institutional 
holdings, number of analysts, and audit, respectively. The interaction terms of investor protection 
and liquidity and the interaction terms of market monitoring and liquidity are also included to 
capture the slope changes.  
  .	 
 -_,	 
 -_,	 
 -_,	 
 -_,	

 -_,	 
  
 -_0,,	 1  
 2-_,	 1 

 &-_,	 1  
 )-_,	 1  
  !"/$% 
 '(


  
 ,	                                                                                                                 
(eq. 4) 
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Table 1 Variables Description 
 
Variable Symbol Predicted 
sign 
Variable explanation Data Source 
Legal origin  origin -  
(H1) 
1: German-civil-law, 2: French-civil-law, 
3:Scandinavian-civil-law, 4: Common-law 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Legal 
enforcement  
enforce - 
(H1) 
The index is constructed by three measures: 1. 
the efficiency of the judicial system, 2. rule of 
law, and 3. the corruption index. 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Outside 
investor 
rights 
outsider - 
(H1) 
The anti-director rights index is composed by 
proxy by mail allowed, shares not blocked 
before meeting, cumulative voting, oppressed 
minority, preemptive right to new issues, and 
percentage of share capital to call an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting. This is a 
measure of minority shareholder rights. The 
index ranges from zero to five.  
Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008)  
Importance 
of equity 
market 
equ - 
(H1) 
It is composed by three variables: 1. the ratio of 
the aggregate stock market capitalization held 
by minority shareholders to gross national 
product, 2. the ratio of listed domestic firms to 
the population, and 3. the ratio of IPOs to the 
population. 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Institutional 
ownership 
inst - 
(H1) 
Institutional ownership is defined as the sum of 
all institutional holdings in a firm’s stock 
divided by market capitalization. 
Ferreira and 
Matos (2008) 
Disclosure dis - 
(H1) 
The index is evaluated by seven categories, 
including general information, income 
statement, balance sheets, cash flow statement, 
accounting standards, stock data, and special 
item.  
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Number of 
analysts 
ana - 
(H1) 
Number of analysts following the companies in 
a country 
Bushman, 
Piotroski, and 
Smith (2003) 
Audit aud - 
(H1) 
The percentage of firms in the country audited 
by the big 5 accounting firms. Audit equals 1, 2, 
3, or 4 if the percentage ranges between (0, 
25%), (25, 50%), (50, 75%), and (75, 100%), 
respectively. 
Bushman, 
Piotroski, and 
Smith (2003) 
Amihud 
liquidity 
ratio 
liq - 
(H2) 
The inverse of the absolute price change per 
dollar of trading volume 
Compustat 
Global Security 
Daily 
Accounting 
standards 
IFRS/ 
GAAP 
- 
(H3) 
1: IFRS  
0: U.S. GAAP  
Compustat 
Global  
 
U.S. market us - 
(H4) 
1: U.S. market 
0: Home country 
Compustat 
Global and 
Compustat 
North America  
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Table 1 continued   
Post-listing post - 
(H5) 
1:Post-listing  
0: Pre-listing 
Compustat 
Global and 
Compustat 
North America 
Variable Symbol Predicted 
sign 
Variable explanation Data Source 
Exchange exch - 
(H6) 
1: U.S. major stock market 
0: U.S. OTC 
Compustat 
North America 
Market-to-
book 
mb  Market value of equity over book value of 
equity 
Compustat 
Global 
Total assets at  Logarithm of total assets Compustat 
Global 
Debt-to-
Equity ratio 
dr  Total liability over total stockholder’s equity Compustat 
Global 
 
where  stands for the *+ firm in the ,*+ country and  is the error term. 
In other alternative specifications to alleviate potential endogeneity problem, I 
incorporate a fixed industry effect and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation into 
the analysis. Firm and country fixed effects cannot be implemented because the explanatory 
variables of investor protection and market monitoring in the models are country-level variables. 
GMM is a commonly used method because GMM estimation does not require any distributional 
specifications for consistency and its estimated coefficients are consistent, unbiased, and 
efficient.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Earnings Management across Firms and Countries 
The summary statistics for the firm-level EM1, EM2, EM3 and aggregate earnings 
management index for 432 cross-listed firms for the period from 2000 to 2009 are shown in 
Table 2. The average aggregate earnings management score is 176.688 and the median is 
174.667. The variation across firms is 57.080. The skewness of the aggregate EM is 0.132, 
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indicating the distribution is not highly skewed. The negative kurtosis of -0.18 shows the 
distribution has a lower wider peak around the mean and thinner tail.  
The country-level degree of earnings management is presented in Table 3.7 The first 
column shows the number of cross-listed firms from each country. The highest aggregate 
earnings management score falls on India (32.333), followed by Germany (31.000), Portugal 
(30.667), Japan (30.667), and Greece (30.667). This result might be explained by either weak 
legal system or weak market monitoring in these five countries. For example, in Japan investor 
protection is strong but market monitoring is relatively weak. This finding suggests that legal 
factor alone is not able to explain variations in earnings management. In contrast, countries with 
the lowest aggregate earnings management score in order are Ireland (5.000), New Zealand 
(7.667), Australia (9.333), United Kingdom (11.333), and Denmark (13.667). The commonalities 
of these countries are strong legal protection and high quality of audit. Therefore, the patterns 
suggest that both investor protection and market monitoring have effects on the degree of 
earnings management. 
 
4.2 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics of country level investor protection and market monitoring across 34 
countries are displayed in Table 4. Panel A of Table 4 presents the investor protection variables, 
including legal enforcement and outside investor rights. The average legal enforcement is 8.320 
                                                          
7
 Appendix C reports the earnings management across five regions based on the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) classification. Five regions include America Emerging, Asia Developed, Asia 
Emerging, Europe Developed, and Europe Emerging, Israel, and South Africa. Since Cayman Islands and 
Luxembourg are not included in the MSCI classification, so the number of firms drops to 416 from 432. 
The Asia Emerging countries have the highest aggregate EM of 212.667, followed by Asia Developed 
(197.333). On average, European countries have the less earnings management.  
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Earnings Management Measures  
Measures of earnings management are computed for 432 cross-listed firms across 34 countries over the 
period of 2000 to 2009. The method of computing earnings management measures is based on Leuz, 
Nanda, and Wysocki (2003). Earnings management 1 (EM1) is calculated as a ratio of the firm-level 
standard deviation of operating earnings over the firm-level standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations in the sample period. Earnings management 2 (EM2) is the Spearman correlation between 
changes in accruals and changes in operating cash flow for each firm. Earnings management 3 (EM3) is a 
firm’s median of the absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flow from operations.  
The aggregate earnings management score (aggregate EM) is calculated by taking the average of the firm 
rankings for these three earnings management measures.  
 
 Measure 
Number of 
firms Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
EM1 432 0.166 0.001 3.995 23.575 554.854 
EM2 432 -0.720 -0.829 0.328 1.980 4.448 
EM3 432 0.684 0.601 0.575 8.483 107.316 
Aggregate EM 432 176.688 174.667 57.080 0.132 -0.180 
 
 
out of 10.0 and its median is 9.053 out of 10.0, indicating that most countries have efficient 
judicial system and low corruption index. The outside investor right has the mean of 3.979 out of 
5.0 with standard deviation of 1.02, so legal system on average does offer some protection to 
minority shareholders. Panel B of Table 4 reports summary statistics for the market monitoring 
variables. The mean of the importance of equity market is 44.256.  Variations in the importance 
of equity market are large and this is partially attributable to the variation in population. For 
instance, the population in China is approximately 1,400 million so that the importance of equity 
market is low at 22.11. The average percentage of institutional ownership in a country is 
19.459%. The average disclosure quality is 66.378 out of 100.0. The average number of financial 
analysts following companies in a country is 18. The percentage of firms in a country audited by 
the large five accounting firms is between 50% and 75%. Overall, it appears that the degree of 
financial transparency for firms around the world is moderate. Panel C reports the summary 
statistics of liquidity and control variables. The mean of the Amihud illiquidity ratio indicates 
that the average price change per dollar of yearly trading volume is 38.932. The standard 
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Table 3 Measures of Earnings Management by Country 
 
EM1 is a ratio of the country-level standard deviation of operating earnings over the country-level 
standard deviation of cash flow from operations. EM2 is the Spearman correlation between changes in 
accruals and changes in operating cash flow. EM3 is a country’s median of the absolute value of accruals 
scaled by the absolute value of cash flow from operations.  Aggregate EM is the average of the country 
rankings for EM1-EM3. There are 432 cross-listed firms from 34 countries. 
 
Country Number of firms EM1 EM2 EM3 Aggregate EM 
Argentina 7 0.001 -0.637 0.650 18.333 
Australia 22 0.005 -0.670 0.478 9.333 
Bermuda 5 0.001 -0.833 0.503 17.667 
Brazil 35 0.000 -0.895 0.686 29.667 
Cayman Islands 5 0.021 -0.632 1.050 20.000 
Chile 15 0.000 -0.913 0.542 30.000 
China 12 0.000 -0.541 0.594 17.667 
Denmark 3 0.000 -0.574 0.283 13.667 
Finland 4 0.001 -0.746 0.731 24.667 
France 31 0.001 -0.808 0.670 22.333 
Germany 23 0.000 -0.902 0.707 31.000 
Greece 3 0.001 -0.954 0.704 30.667 
Hong Kong 9 0.000 -0.809 0.525 23.333 
India 2 0.000 -0.907 0.577 32.333 
Indonesia 8 0.000 -0.857 0.684 30.333 
Ireland 7 0.055 -0.545 0.479 5.000 
Israel 9 0.013 -0.522 0.779 16.000 
Italy 7 0.000 -0.792 0.477 20.000 
Japan 36 0.000 -0.789 0.674 30.667 
Korea 7 0.000 -0.711 0.655 29.333 
Luxembourg 6 0.003 -0.413 0.714 16.000 
Mexico 18 0.000 -0.692 0.528 17.333 
Netherlands 22 0.002 -0.642 0.622 17.000 
New Zealand 4 0.004 -0.180 0.575 7.667 
Norway 6 0.000 -0.626 0.550 20.333 
Portugal 2 0.000 -0.995 0.592 30.667 
Russia 7 0.000 -0.282 0.509 11.667 
Singapore 2 0.003 -0.603 0.971 20.000 
South Africa 10 0.001 -0.780 0.594 21.000 
Spain 4 0.000 -0.696 0.618 26.333 
Sweden 10 0.000 -0.751 0.609 23.667 
Switzerland 11 0.000 -0.841 0.487 19.333 
Taiwan 7 0.000 -0.546 0.681 24.667 
United Kingdom 73 0.002 -0.616 0.520 11.333 
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deviation of the Amihud illiquidity ratio is 562.493. The mean of market-to-book is 51.157 and 
its median is 0.341. The logarithm of total assets has the mean of 11.589 which is equivalent to 
$107,904 million of total assets. The mean of debt-to-equity ratio is 2.504, implying that cross-
listed firms use more debt financing than equity financing. The correlation statistics are reported 
in Appendices D and E. 8  
 
4.3 Univariate Analysis 
First, univariate analysis is conducted to examine the relationship between earnings 
management and investor protection, market monitoring, or liquidity. Multivariate regression  
analysis will be discussed in section 4.5. For univariate analyses, the sample is split based on the 
mean and median of each variable to examine any significant differences in earnings 
management. 
                                                          
8
 Appendix D shows the correlations of the aggregate earnings management score, investor protection, 
and market monitoring. Consistent with the first hypothesis, the aggregate earnings management is 
significantly negatively associated with legal origin, legal enforcement, and outside investor rights. It 
suggests that cross-listed firms in countries with strong investor protection and legal system have less 
degree of earnings management. The correlation between the aggregate earnings management and each 
market monitoring variable is consistent with the first hypothesis as well, suggesting that earnings 
management is more pervasive in countries with less developed equity market, less institutional 
monitoring, poor accounting disclosure quality, less analysts followed, and low portion of firms audited 
by the largest five accounting firms. Among the market monitoring proxies, institutional ownership has 
the largest and significantly negative correlation (-0.191) with the aggregate earnings management score. 
The presence of institutional stockholders restrains earnings manipulation by managers who have 
incentives to report more losses or deter profits. However, the importance of equity market and disclosure 
are significantly associated with the aggregate earnings management but are highly correlated 
(approximately 0.5) with legal origin and legal enforcement.   
Appendix E reports the correlations of earnings management and control variables. The aggregate 
earnings management index is positively correlated with the Amihud illiquidity ratio, inferring that more 
liquid cross-listed firms are associated with less earnings management. Market-to-book is positively 
related to the aggregate earnings management score, indicating that growth firms are inclined to manage 
earnings. A significant positive correlation between total assets and the aggregate earnings management 
suggests that large firms are prone to conduct earnings manipulation. However, the correlation between 
the aggregate earnings management and debt-to-equity ratio is insignificant.  
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 Table 4 Summary Statistics of Investor Protection, Market Monitoring, and Control Variables 
 
Panel A represents descriptive statistics for the investor protection variables. Legal enforcement is an 
index constructed by La Porta et al. (1998) and is measured by three ways: the efficiency of the judicial 
system, rule of law, and the corruption index. Outside investor rights is an anti-director index developed 
by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), ranges from 0 to 5. Panel B represents 
descriptive statistics for the market monitoring variables. Indexes of the importance of equity market, 
ownership concentration, and disclosure are from La Porta et al. (1998). Importance of equity market is 
composed by three variables: 1) the ratio of the aggregate stock market capitalization held by minority 
shareholders to gross national product, 2) the ratio of listed domestic firms to the population, and 3) the 
ratio of IPOs to the population. Institutional ownership is defined as the sum of all institutional holdings 
in a firm’s stock divided by market capitalization and is from Ferreira and Matos (2008). Disclosure is 
evaluated by seven categories, consisting of general information, income statement, balance sheets, cash 
flow statement, accounting standards, stock data, and special item. Number of analysts is the number of 
financial analysts following companies in the country. Audit measures the degree of audit quality. 
Analysts and audit are based upon Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2003). There are total 432 cross-listed 
firms across 34 countries. Panel C reports descriptive statistics for control variables. Amihud illiquidity 
ratio is defined as |5| 1 $758888888888888888888 1 10, where the bar on top of the ratio is the notation for the average. 
The Amihud illiquidity ratio is the average of daily price impact ratios, and then scaled by 1 million. 
Market to book is the market value of equity over the book value of equity at the end of firm year. Total 
assets is the logarithm of total assets. Debt-to-equity ratio is a ratio of total liabilities over total 
stockholder’s equity.  
 
Variable 
Number of 
countries Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A. Investor protection             
Legal enforcement 28 8.320 9.053 1.535 -0.941 -0.128 
Outside investor right 32 3.979 4.000 1.020 -0.831 0.085 
       
Panel B. Market monitoring       
Importance of equity market 33 44.256 35.179 29.395 1.853 5.120 
Institutional ownership 22 19.459 20.100 7.002 0.359 -0.476 
Disclosure 26 66.378 65.000 9.195 -0.376 -0.149 
Number of analysts 29 17.664 18.530 7.400 0.030 -0.304 
Audit 29 3.560 4.000 0.706 -1.758 3.015 
       
Panel C. Control variables       
Amihud illiquidity ratio 34 38.932 0.001 562.493 17.232 298.655 
Market to book 34 51.157 0.341 1016.179 23.231 543.123 
Total assets 34 11.589 10.286 4.692 0.900 0.413 
Debt-to-equity ratio 34 2.504 1.394 7.146 14.999 273.698 
 
The first hypothesis is that cross-listed companies from the countries with strong legal 
protection have less degree of earnings management. The results of the analysis on this 
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hypothesis are illustrated in Table 5. Panel A of Table 5 compares aggregate earnings 
management measures in four legal origins, including Common Law, Scandinavian Civil Law, 
French Civil Law, and German Civil Law. Because the composite earnings index is based on 
ranks, the difference in the means is tested by the nonparametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test 
while the difference in the medians is tested by the nonparametric Median Score test. The means 
of earnings management for cross-listed firms in countries following German Civil Law 
(199.291), French Civil Law (181.469), Scandinavian Civil Law (173.886), and Common Law 
(158.156) jointly are significantly different at the 1% level using the F-test. The medians of 
earnings management for cross-listed firms in countries with Common Law, Scandinavian Civil 
Law, French Civil Law, and German Civil Law are 154, 179, 182, and 198.333, respectively. In 
particularly, the aggregate earnings management scores show a descending order from Civil Law 
to Common Law. This suggests that Common Law offers stronger legal investors’ rights and 
protections than Civil Law does. Panel B of Table 5 presents the means and medians differences 
based on legal enforcement and outside investor rights. The result shows significant negative 
differences of earnings management scores between the above- and below-mean and median of 
legal enforcement; the differences are -8.030 and -14.833, respectively. These results imply that 
managers’ incentives of misreporting earnings are weakened in more efficient judicial system. 
As for outside investor rights, either the mean (-2.022) or median (-3.667) difference of the 
earnings management score is negative but only the difference in medians is significant. 
Therefore, there is some evidence, albeit not strongly, that better investor rights are associated 
with less earnings management. The univariate analysis of the role of market monitoring on 
earnings management is reported in Table 6.  The difference in means is -25.363, significant at 
the 1% significance level. The mean differences of the aggregate earnings management scores 
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for institutional ownership, disclosure, number of analysts, and audit quality are -33.983, -24.551, 
-30.124, and -8.500, respectively, and significant at the 10% significance level. Consistent with 
the mean comparisons, the differences in medians of market monitoring variables are also 
significant at the 1% level and the signs are consistent with the predictions. The results suggest 
that institutional holding has the highest impact on earnings management. A high level of 
institutional ownership can effectively reduce the use of discretionary accruals and thereby 
discourage earnings management. Overall evidence implies that cross-listed firms in countries 
with highly developed equity market, large portion of institutional ownership, more financial 
analysts following, and higher percentage of audited firms discourage opportunistic earnings 
management.  
 
4.4 Market Comparisons and Comparison of Pre and Post Listing Earnings Management 
The third hypothesis is that cross-listed firms adopting IFRS accounting standards have 
lower level of earnings management than those following U.S. GAAP. Univariate results are 
presented in Table 7. It should be noted that some cross-listed firms follow neither IFRS nor U.S. 
GAAP but rather their own domestic standards; these firms are excluded in this analysis. The 
mean and median differences of the aggregate earnings management scores are significant and 
consistent with the third hypothesis that cross-listed firms adopting the IFRS are less likely to 
engage in earnings management.  
The fourth hypothesis is that, on average, the degree of earnings management for cross-
listed firms is expected to be greater in the home country than in the U.S. market because U.S.’s 
stricter regulation and market monitoring limit the manipulation of accounting information  
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Table 5 Univariate Analysis of Investor Protection and Earnings Management 
 
The aggregate earnings management score (aggregate EM) is calculated by taking the average of the firm rankings for three earnings management 
measures, EM1-EM3. Panel A is the univariate analysis of Legal origin. Legal origin is created by La Porta et al. (1998) and classifies countries 
into Common law, Scandinavian civil law, French civil law, and German civil law. The F test is used to test the significance of the joint difference. 
P-value indicates the significance of the difference. 
 
Panel A. Legal origin       
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
 German civil law French civil law 
Scandinavian 
civil law Common law F-test P-value 
Mean comparison  199.291 181.469 173.886 158.156 66.887 [0.000] 
Median comparison 198.333 182.000 179.000 154.000 68.145 [0.000] 
 
 
Panel B is the univariate analysis of Legal enforcement and Outsider investor rights. The sample is separated by the mean and median values of 
each investor protection variable to examine the difference of the aggregate earnings management score. Legal enforcement is an index 
constructed by La Porta et al. (1998) and is measured by three measures: (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) rule of law, and (3) the 
corruption index. Outside investor rights, an anti-director rights index developed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), 
ranges from 0 to 5. The difference in the means is tested by the nonparametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. The difference in the medians is 
tested by the nonparametric Median Score test. P-value indicates the significance of the difference. 
 
Panel B. Investor Protection 
    
 Above mean Below mean Difference P-value 
Variable (1) (2) (1)-(2)   
Part A. Mean comparison         
Legal Enforcement 173.399 181.430 -8.030 [0.001] 
Outsider investor rights 176.346 178.369 -2.022 [0.682] 
     
Part B. Median comparison     
Legal Enforcement 166.667 181.500 -14.833 [0.019] 
Outsider investor rights 174.333 178.000 -3.667 [0.066] 
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Table 6 Univariate Analysis of Market Monitoring and Earnings Management 
 
The sample is separated by the mean and median values of each market monitoring variable to examine 
the difference of the aggregate earnings management scores. The aggregate earnings management score 
(aggregate EM) is calculated by taking the average of the firm rankings for three earnings management 
measures, EM1-EM3. Importance of equity market is an index which is constructed by La Porta et al. 
(1998). It is composed by three variables: 1) the ratio of the aggregate stock market capitalization held by 
minority shareholders to gross national product, 2) the ratio of listed domestic firms to the population, and 
3) the ratio of IPOs to the population. Institutional ownership is defined as the sum of all institutional 
holdings in a firm’s stock divided by market capitalization and is from Ferreira and Matos (2008). 
Number of analysts is the number of financial analysts following the companies in a country. Audit 
measures the degree of audit quality. Analysts and audit are based upon Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 
(2003). The difference in the means is tested by the nonparametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. The 
difference in the medians is tested by the nonparametric Median Score test. P-value indicates the 
significance of the difference. 
 
 Above mean Below mean Difference P-value 
Variable (1) (2) (1)-(2)  
Part A. Mean comparison     
Importance of Equity Market 161.732 187.096 -25.363 [0.000] 
Institutional Ownership 165.785 199.769 -33.983 [0.000] 
Disclosure 162.135 186.686 -24.551 [0.000] 
Number of Analysts 162.419 192.543 -30.124 [0.000] 
Audit 174.823 183.323 -8.500 [0.065] 
     
Part B. Median comparison     
Importance of Equity Market 163.000 188.000 -25.000 [0.000] 
Institutional Ownership 164.667 198.333 -33.667 [0.000] 
Disclosure 161.333 189.000 -27.667 [0.000] 
Number of Analysts 161.333 189.000 -27.667 [0.000] 
Audit 174.000 181.667 -7.667 [0.001] 
 
reported to outside investors. This hypothesis is tested by employing three earnings management 
measures. The result is reported in Table 8.9 All the mean and median differences under the four 
EM measures have the signs as predicted. Recall that the higher the EM1/EM2, the lesser the 
earnings smoothing; the higher the EM3, the higher the earnings discretion; the higher the 
aggregate EM, the higher the earnings management. Hence that evidence shows, on average, 
ADRs are associated with a lower tendency to adopt earnings smoothing and earnings discretion. 
                                                          
9
 The univariate analysis of Home country and the U.S. market by country is also reported on Appendix F. 
Cross-listed firms from 28 out of 34 countries have consistent results that the degree of earnings 
management in ADR is significantly less than that in the Home countries. 
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Table 7 Effects of Accounting Standards 
 
This table presents the mean and median values of the aggregate earnings management scores between 
the choice of accounting standards, U.S. GAAP and IFRS. Earnings management 1 (EM1) is calculated as 
a ratio of the firm-level standard deviation of operating earnings over the firm-level standard deviation of 
cash flow from operations in the sample period. Earnings management 2 (EM2) is the Spearman 
correlation between changes in accruals and changes in operating cash flow for each firm. Earnings 
management 3 (EM3) is a firm’s median of the absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of 
cash flow from operations. The aggregate earnings management score (aggregate EM) is calculated by 
taking the average of the firm rankings for three earnings management measures, EM1-EM3. Part A is the 
mean earnings management measure comparison between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. Part B is the median 
earnings management measure comparison between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. Difference is the aggregate 
earnings management score of IFRS minus that of U.S. GAAP. T-statistics to test the difference in the 
means and medians for EM1-EM3 are reported. The nonparametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test and 
Median Score test are conducted to test the difference in means and medians of aggregate EM, 
respectively. P-values are in brackets. The number of firms following IFRS is 189 while the number of 
firms following U.S. GAAP is 45. The sample period is from 2000 to 2009. 
 
 IFRS  U.S. GAAP  Difference P-value 
EM measure (1) (2) (1)-(2)   
Part A. Mean comparison     
EM1 0.422 -0.012 0.434 [0.000] 
EM2 -0.733 -0.659 -0.075 [0.980] 
EM3 0.621 0.768 -0.147 [0.000] 
Aggregate EM 165.168 173.024 -7.855 [0.012] 
     
Part B. Median comparison     
EM1 0.000 0.001 0.000 [0.001] 
EM2 -0.833 -0.867 0.033 [0.060] 
EM3 0.562 0.681 -0.119 [0.000] 
Aggregate EM 164.667 169.000 -4.333 [0.010] 
 
The possible explanations are as follows: 1) ADR firms on the U.S. major stock markets 
must follow the SEC regulations so making earnings management difficult. 2) ADR firms in the 
U.S. market are protected by strong legal enforcement, investor protection, and market 
monitoring. The fifth hypothesis provides further support of that the U.S. market does provide 
powerful legal system and investor protection. If so, then foreign firms should limit the 
manipulation of earnings after cross-listing shares in the U.S. market. The results comparing pre 
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Table 8 Comparison of Home Country and the U.S. Market  
 
Earnings management 1 (EM1) is calculated as a ratio of the firm-level standard deviation of operating 
earnings over the firm-level standard deviation of cash flow from operations in the sample period. 
Earnings management 2 (EM2) is the Spearman correlation between changes in accruals and changes in 
operating cash flow for each firm. Earnings management 3 (EM3) is a firm’s median of the absolute value 
of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flow from operations. Part A reports the mean comparison 
of earnings management measure for Home and ADR. Part B shows median comparison of earnings 
management measure for Home and ADR. Difference is the earnings management of the ADR market 
minus the earnings management of the Home market. T-statistics to test the difference in the means and 
medians between ADR and Home for EM1-EM3 are reported. The nonparametric Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test and Median Score test are conducted to test the difference in means and medians of 
aggregate EM between ADR and Home, respectively. P-values are in brackets. The sample includes 432 
firms across 34 countries over the period from 2000 to 2009. 
 
 ADR Home Difference P-value 
EM measure (1) (2) (1)-(2)  
Part A. Mean comparison     
EM1 0.720 0.163 0.557 [0.000] 
EM2 -0.505 -0.721 0.216 [0.000] 
EM3 1.199 1.879 -0.680 [0.000] 
Aggregate EM 176.961 216.884 -39.923 [0.000] 
Part B. Median comparison     
EM1 0.886 0.000 0.885 [0.000] 
EM2 -0.667 -0.833 0.167 [0.000] 
EM3 0.762 0.796 -0.033 [0.001] 
Aggregate EM 175.000 217.667 -42.667 [0.000] 
 
and post-listing periods are reported in Table 910. This finding implies that the degree of earnings 
management is higher before cross-listing on the U.S. market.  
The sixth hypothesis is that firms listed in U.S. major stock markets have lower 
propensity to involve in earnings management than those listed in the OTC market because OTC 
is subject to a lesser degree of regulation. For instance, after the implementation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002, several foreign companies, especially for small firms, have switched to OTC 
                                                          
10
 Appendix G displays the degree of earnings management in the pre-listing and post-listing periods by 
country. The results indicate that the level of earnings management in the pre-listing period is higher than 
that in the post-listing period for all countries, except Chile and South Africa. Because Chile and South 
Africa have small number of observations in the pre-listing period, the results are insignificant or 
inconsistent. 
29 
 
Table 9 Comparison of Pre-listing Period and Post-listing Period 
 
Earnings management 1 (EM1) is calculated as a ratio of the firm-level standard deviation of operating 
earnings over the firm-level standard deviation of cash flow from operations in the sample period. 
Earnings management 2 (EM2) is the Spearman correlation between changes in accruals and changes in 
operating cash flow for each firm. Earnings management 3 (EM3) is a firm’s median of the absolute value 
of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flow from operations. The aggregate earnings 
management score (aggregate EM) is calculated by taking the average of the firm rankings for three 
earnings management measures, EM1-EM3. Part A is the mean earnings management measure 
comparison between Pre-listing and Post-listing. Part B is the median earnings management measure 
comparison between Pre-listing and Post-listing. Difference is the earnings management measure of the 
Post-listing minus the earnings management measure of the Pre-listing. T-statistics to test the difference 
in the means and medians for EM1-EM3 are reported. The nonparametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test 
and Median Score test are conducted to test the difference in means and medians of aggregate EM, 
respectively. P-values are in brackets. The sample includes 432 firms across 34 countries over the period 
from 2000 to 2009. 
 
 Post-listing Pre-listing Difference P-value 
EM measure (1) (2) (1)-(2)   
Part A. Mean comparison     
EM1 0.166 -0.088 0.254 [0.000] 
EM2 -0.720 -0.853 0.134 [0.000] 
EM3 0.684 1.360 -0.676 [0.000] 
Aggregate EM 275.047 298.923 -23.875 [0.000] 
     
Part B. Median comparison     
EM1 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.000] 
EM2 -0.829 -0.967 0.138 [0.000] 
EM3 0.601 0.749 -0.147 [0.001] 
Aggregate EM 266.667 286.333 -19.667 [0.001] 
 
markets from the NASDAQ to avoid the compliance of tighten regulation, the administrative 
burden, and costly fees (Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, Talley, 2006; McLean, 2005). This hypothesis 
is tested using the ADR shares’ earnings. The results are reported in Table 10. Both the mean 
and median differences of the earnings management measure suggest that on average, foreign 
firms cross-listed in the U.S. major stock market have lower tendency to engage in earnings 
smoothing and earnings discretion, consistent with my hypothesis.  
 
 
30 
 
Table 10 Comparison of Stocks Listed in U.S Major Stock Markets and OTC 
 
This table presents the mean and median values of the aggregate earnings management scores between 
the choice of the cross-listing exchange markets, the U.S. major stock market and the U.S. over-the-
counter (OTC). The method of computing earnings management measures is based on Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki (2003). Earnings management 1 (EM1) is calculated as a ratio of the firm-level standard 
deviation of operating earnings over the firm-level standard deviation of cash flow from operations in the 
sample period. Earnings management 2 (EM2) is the Spearman correlation between changes in accruals 
and changes in operating cash flow for each firm. Earnings management 3 (EM3) is a firm’s median of 
the absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flow from operations. The aggregate 
earnings management score (aggregate EM) is calculated by taking the average of the firm rankings for 
three earnings management measures, EM1-EM3. Part A is the mean earnings management measure 
comparison between Major Exchanges and OTC. Part B is the median earnings management measure 
comparison between Major Exchanges and OTC. Difference is the aggregate earnings management score 
of firms cross-listing on the U.S. major stock market minus that of those firms cross-listing on the U.S. 
OTC. T-statistics to test the difference in the means and medians for EM1-EM3 are reported. The 
nonparametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test and Median Score test are conducted to test the difference in 
means and medians of aggregate EM, respectively. P-values are in brackets. The number of cross-listed 
firms in the US major exchanges is 373 while the number of cross-listed firms in the U.S. OTC is 174. 
The sample period is from 2000 to 2009. 
 
  Major stock market OTC Difference P-value 
EM measure (1) (2) (1)-(2)  
Part A. Mean comparison     
EM1 0.761 0.702 0.059 [0.000] 
EM2 -0.449 -0.530 0.081 [0.000] 
EM3 0.540 0.577 -0.036 [0.003] 
Aggregate EM 176.353 178.432 -2.079 [0.365] 
     
Part B. Median comparison     
EM1 0.925 0.858 0.067 [0.000] 
EM2 -0.571 -0.700 0.129 [0.000] 
EM3 0.608 0.651 -0.043 [0.075] 
Aggregate EM 174.333 175.667 -1.333 [0.574] 
 
4.5The Roles of Investor Protection, Market Monitoring, and Liquidity in Earnings 
Management: Regression Analyses 
In the previous section, I use the univariate analysis to test the hypotheses and the results 
are consistent with my predictions. This section discusses results of multivariate regression 
analyses that investigate the relations between earnings management and investor protection, 
market monitoring, liquidity, and accounting standards. The dependent variable in the regression 
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equation is the aggregate earnings management score. The explanatory variables include three 
categories, investor protection (legal origin and outside investor rights), market monitoring 
(institutional ownership, number of analysts, and audit quality), and liquidity (Amihud liquidity 
ratio). To avoid the multi-collinearity problem, variables with similar meaning and high 
correlations are not included in the same regression. Specifically, the correlation between legal 
origin and outside investor rights is 53.1%; these variables are not used in the same regression. 
To account for potential heteroskedasticity, the t values are adjusted based on White (1980).   
The regression results are shown in Table 11. In Model 1, legal origin is significantly 
negatively associated with earnings management, indicating that the degree of earnings 
management from high to low is German Civil Law, French Civil Law, Scandinavian Civil Law, 
and Common Law. Institutional ownership, number of analysts, and audit are significantly 
negatively related with earnings management, suggesting that market monitoring restrains 
earnings management in an effective manner. Liquidity is significantly negatively associated 
with earnings management, meaning that liquid cross-listed firms have less earnings 
management than illiquid firms. Consistent with previous results, large firms are more likely to 
manipulate earnings than small firms.  
To examine the effect of IFRS on earnings management, Model 2 and Model 4 in Table 
11 include a dummy variable of accounting standards, IFRS/GAAP. Since not all firms follow 
either IFRS or U.S. GAAP, the total sample firms drop to 234 after the inclusion of the dummy 
variable of IFRS/GAAP. The result is consistent with that of Model 1. The negative relation 
between IFRS/GAAP and the aggregate earnings management index suggests that IFRS reduces 
the occurrence of earnings management. Both Model 3 and Model 4 use the outside investor 
rights index as a proxy for investor protection. The results are consistent with those of Models 1 
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Table 11 Regression Analysis of Earnings Management 
 
The dependent variable is the aggregate earnings management (). Legal origin () is based upon La Porta et al. (1998). Outside 
investor rights () is an anti-director rights index. Institutional ownership () is the sum of all institutional holdings in a firm’s stock 
divided by market capitalization. Number of analysts () is the average number of financial analysts following companies in a country. Audit 
() measures the degree of audit quality. The Amihud liquidity ratio () is defined as the inverse of |5| 1 $758888888888888888888 1 10. Market to book 
('() is the market value of equity over the book value of equity. Total assets () is the logarithm of total assets. Debt-to-equity ratio () is a 
ratio of total liabilities over total stockholder’s equity. Control variables are adjusted by the country’s average. There are 432 cross-listed firms 
across 34 countries. IFRS/GAAP is a dummy variable that equal to one for IFRS and zero for U.S. GAAP. After including the dummy of 
IFRS/GAAP, the number of firms drops to 234. The subscript  and , represent the *+ firm in the ,*+ country.  is the error term. 
 
  ,	 
 ,	 
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,	 
 ,	 
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& 
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 ,	 
 
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Predicted sign Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Constant  211.877 [0.000] 212.516 [0.000] 287.047 [0.000] 291.839 [0.000] 
Legal Origin - -11.285 [0.000] -11.713 [0.000]     
Outside investor rights -     -12.804 [0.000] -13.610 [0.000] 
Institutional ownership - -2.030 [0.000] -1.926 [0.000] -2.115 [0.000] -2.028 [0.000] 
Number of analysts - -0.729 [0.000] -0.632 [0.001] -0.579 [0.003] -0.479 [0.012] 
Audit - -4.542 [0.016] -4.990 [0.008] -4.615 [0.017] -4.952 [0.010] 
Amihud liquidity ratio - -1.459 [0.000] -1.468 [0.000] -1.392 [0.000] -1.400 [0.000] 
IFRS/GAAP -   -10.730 [0.000]   -10.991 [0.000] 
Market-to-book   1.308 [0.001] 1.276 [0.001] 1.253 [0.001] 1.217 [0.002] 
Total assets  6.813 [0.000] 6.990 [0.000] 6.979 [0.000] 7.169 [0.000] 
Debt-to-equity ratio  1.682 [0.014] 1.515 [0.026] 1.791 [0.009] 1.625 [0.017] 
          
Adjusted-R2  0.139  0.145  0.126  0.133  
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and 2 that cross-listed firms in countries with strong investor rights, high institutional ownership, 
and more financial analysts following are less inclined to manage earnings and that cross-listed 
firms adopting IFRS are less prone to manipulate earnings than cross-listed firms following U.S. 
GAAP. 
To control for potential industry effects, I incorporate a fixed industry effect model to 
assess the relationship between earnings management and investor protection, market monitoring, 
and liquidity, reported in Table 12. Overall, cross-listed firms in countries with strong legal 
system, concentrated institutional ownership, more financial analysts following, high quality of 
audit, and the adoption of IFRS have lower propensity in managing earnings. Highly liquid 
cross-listed firms are less opportunistic than illiquid ones in earnings report. In addition, market-
to-book, total assets, and debt-to-equity ratio are significantly positively related with earnings 
management, indicating that firms with high growth opportunity, large size, or high debt 
financing  are more likely to manipulate earnings. In sum, after controlling for industry effects, 
the relationships between earnings management and investor protection, market monitoring, and 
liquidity remain evident. As an alternative specification, Table 13 presents GMM estimations. 
The results remain consistent with the hypotheses. 
As another alternative specification, Table 14 transforms investor protection and market 
monitoring variables into dummies and includes interaction terms with liquidity. The dummy 
variables are equal to 1 for high investor protection or monitoring and 0 otherwise. The dummy 
variable of D_Legal origin is equal to 1 for common law and 0 for civil law. The evidence shows 
significantly negative relations between earnings management and legal origin, outside investor 
rights, institutional ownership, and IFRS/GAAP. Again, this is consistent with the above findings
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Table 12 Regression Analysis of Earnings Management with Fixed Effect  
 
The dependent variable is the aggregate earnings management (). Legal origin () is based upon La Porta et al. (1998). Outside 
investor rights () is an anti-director rights index. Institutional ownership () is defined as the sum of all institutional holdings in a 
firm’s stock divided by market capitalization. Number of analysts () is the average number of financial analysts following companies in a 
country. Audit () measures the degree of audit quality. The Amihud liquidity ratio () is defined as the inverse of |5| 1 $758888888888888888888 1 10. 
Market to book ('() is the market value of equity over the book value of equity at the end of firm year. Total assets () is the logarithm of total 
assets. Debt-to-equity ratio (dr) is a ratio of total liabilities over total stockholder’s equity. Control variables are adjusted by the country’s average. 
IFRS/GAAP is a dummy variable that equal to one for IFRS and zero for U.S. GAAP. There are 432 cross-listed firms across 34 countries. The 
subscript  and , represent the *+ firm in the ,*+ country.  is the error term. The industry effect is tested by F test.  
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    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable 
Predicted 
sign Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Legal origin - 
-6.620 [0.000] -6.287 [0.000]     
Outside investor rights - 
    -0.128 [0.000] -0.776 [0.000] 
Institutional ownership - 
-0.227 [0.000] -0.100 [0.000] -0.434 [0.000] -0.291 [0.000] 
Number of analysts - 
-0.969 [0.000] -0.867 [0.000] -0.533 [0.000] -0.438 [0.000] 
Audit - 
-5.015 [0.000] -3.964 [0.000] -4.346 [0.000] -3.685 [0.000] 
Amihud liquidity ratio - 
-1.372 [0.000] -1.390 [0.000] -1.358 [0.000] -1.381 [0.000] 
IFRS/GAAP - 
  -6.807 [0.000]   -8.085 [0.000] 
Market-to-book   0.765 [0.000] 0.826 [0.000] 0.765 [0.000] 0.839 [0.000] 
Total assets  4.416 [0.000] 4.394 [0.000] 4.421 [0.000] 4.389 [0.000] 
Debt-to-equity ratio  2.288 [0.000] 2.115 [0.000] 2.238 [0.000] 2.037 [0.000] 
  
        
Adjusted-R2  0.057  0.063  0.036  0.044  
F-test  15.889 [0.000] 15.340 [0.000] 15.837 [0.000] 6.075 [0.000] 
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Table 13 Regression Analysis of Earnings Management with GMM Estimation 
 
The dependent variable is the aggregate earnings management (). Legal origin () is based upon La Porta et al. (1998). Outside 
investor rights () is an anti-director rights index. Institutional ownership () is the sum of all institutional holdings in a firm’s stock 
divided by market capitalization. Number of analysts () is the average number of financial analysts following companies in a country. Audit 
() measures the degree of audit quality. The Amihud liquidity ratio () is defined as the inverse of |5| 1 $758888888888888888888 1 10. Market to book 
('() is the market value of equity over the book value of equity. Total assets () is the logarithm of total assets. Debt-to-equity ratio () is a 
ratio of total liabilities over total stockholder’s equity. Control variables are adjusted by the country’s average. There are 432 cross-listed firms 
across 34 countries. IFRS/GAAP is a dummy variable that equal to one for IFRS and zero for U.S. GAAP. After including the dummy of 
IFRS/GAAP, the number of firms drops to 234. The subscript  and , represent the *+ firm in the ,*+ country.  is the error term. 
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable 
Predicted 
sign Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Constant  175.515 [0.000] 151.276 [0.000] 231.635 [0.000] 258.102 [0.000] 
Legal origin - -4.272 [0.067] -7.568 [0.001]     
Outside investor rights -     -9.588 [0.000] -13.784 [0.000] 
Institutional ownership - -0.264 [0.031] -0.085 [0.025] -0.619 [0.000] -0.332 [0.011] 
Number of analysts - -1.010 [0.000] -1.004 [0.000] -0.940 [0.000] -0.879 [0.000] 
Audit - -2.120 [0.051] -5.635 [0.065] -1.813 [0.029] -3.043 [0.035] 
Amihud liquidity ratio - -1.252 [0.000] -1.420 [0.000] -1.006 [0.000] -1.072 [0.000] 
IFRS/GAAP -   -6.037 [0.023]   -9.557 [0.000] 
Market-to-book   0.568 [0.003] 1.030 [0.009] 0.031 [0.046] 0.076 [0.072] 
Total assets  3.111 [0.011] 4.844 [0.000] 0.148 [0.077] 0.030 [0.076] 
Debt-to-equity ratio  1.545 [0.094] 2.796 [0.005] 0.567 [0.012] 1.552 [0.042] 
          
Adjusted-R2  0.130   0.142   0.112   0.131  
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Table 14 Regression Analysis of Earnings Management with Interaction Terms 
 
The dependent variable is the aggregate earnings management score (). D_origin is equal to 1 for common law and 0 for civil law. 
D_outsider, D_inst, D_ana, and D_aud are dummy variables that equal to 1 if above its mean and zero otherwise. The Amihud liquidity ratio () 
is defined as the inverse of |5| 1 $758888888888888888888 1 10. Control variables are adjusted by the country’s average. IFRS/GAAP is a dummy variable that 
equal to one for IFRS and zero for U.S. GAAP. There are 432 cross-listed firms across 34 countries. The subscript  and , represent the *+ firm in 
the ,*+ country.  is the error term.  
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    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Predicted sign Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Constant   212.885 [0.000] 198.005 [0.000] 221.007 [0.000] 200.288 [0.000] 
D_Legal origin - -27.552 [0.000] -29.913 [0.000]     
D_Outside investor rights -     -24.126 [0.000] -33.471 [0.000] 
D_Institutional ownership - -34.371 [0.000] -23.058 [0.003] -39.544 [0.000] -24.754 [0.001] 
D_Number of analysts - -2.988 [0.014] -1.029 [0.079] -9.880 [0.007] -3.183 [0.032] 
D_Audit - -10.905 [0.001] -5.677 [0.059] -7.835 [0.020] -5.637 [0.061] 
Amihud liquidity ratio - -0.106 [0.079] -0.142 [0.027] -0.267 [0.028] -0.163 [0.014] 
D_origin × liq - 0.000 [0.389] -0.001 [0.104]     
D_out × liq -     -13.935 [0.068] -15.371 [0.034] 
D_inst × liq - 0.000 [0.457] -0.002 [0.108] 0.000 [0.393] -0.001 [0.291] 
D_ana × liq - -0.001 [0.000] -0.001 [0.020] -0.001 [0.006] -0.001 [0.007] 
D_aud × liq - -1.289 [0.002] -0.033 [0.042] 2.294 [0.395] -0.035 [0.048] 
IFRS/GAAP -   -5.056 [0.009]   -3.601 [0.074] 
Market-to-book  -6.506 [0.143] 0.553 [0.501] 0.983 [0.017] 0.530 [0.517] 
Total assets  7.432 [0.000] 12.380 [0.000] 7.090 [0.000] 11.082 [0.000] 
Debt-to-equity ratio  1.865 [0.005] 1.937 [0.201] 1.914 [0.004] 1.991 [0.187] 
          
Adjusted-R2   0.186   0.135   0.162   0.141   
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that cross-listed firms in a country with strong legal system, large institutional ownership, and 
the adoption of IFRS are less prone to involve in opportunistic earnings. The results of 
interaction terms are consistent with the second hypothesis: in a country with strong outside 
investor rights, more analysts following, or high audit quality, liquid firms are less likely to 
misreport earnings than those with low liquidity. This finding further supports the hypotheses 
that in addition to investor protection and market monitoring, liquidity is also important and can 
reduce the incident of opportunistic earnings management.  
 
4.6 Country-Level Regression 
The analyses in the above sections use firm-level earnings management as the dependent 
variable. In this subsection, a country-level analysis is presented. In this analysis, investor 
protection, market monitoring as well as liquidity are country average data. The results are  
displayed in Table 15. The evidence shows a negative association between legal investor 
protection and the country aggregate earnings management score, a negative relation between 
earnings management and market monitoring, a negative association between liquidity and 
earnings management at the 1% significance level. Model 1 and Model 3 explain the variation of 
the country earnings management by 68.9% and 68.4%, respectively. Again, the results support 
the hypothesis that a country with strong legal system, large institutional ownership, more 
financial analysts following, more firms audited by the largest five accounting firms, and high 
liquidity has less degree of earnings management. Model 2 and Model 4 examine the effect of 
IFRS on earnings management. The results are consistent with those in Models 1 and 3. 
Countries following the IFRS accounting standards effectively limit the manipulation of 
accounting information as compared to those following U.S. GAAP. In addition, the GMM  
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Table 15 Country Level Regression Analysis of Earnings Management  
 
The dependent variable is the aggregate earnings management (). The aggregate earnings management score is calculated by taking the 
average of the country rankings for three earnings management measures, EM1-EM3. Legal origin () classifies countries into Common law, 
Scandinavian civil law, French civil law, and German civil law and is based on La Porta et al. (1998). Outside investor rights () is an 
anti-director rights index developed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). Institutional ownership () is defined as the 
sum of all institutional holdings in a firm’s stock divided by market capitalization and is from Ferreira and Matos (2008). Number of analysts () 
is the average number of financial analysts following the companies in a country. Audit () measures the degree of audit quality. Both number 
of analysts and audit are based upon Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2003). The Amihud liquidity ratio () is defined as the inverse of 
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. IFRS/GAAP is a dummy variable that equal to one for IFRS and zero for U.S. GAAP. There are total 34 country-level 
observations. The subscript , represents the  ,*+ country and  is the error term. 
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    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable 
Predicted 
sign Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept   34.349 [0.000] 34.177 [0.000] 27.838 [0.000] 29.092 [0.000] 
Legal origin - -1.246 [0.000] -0.429 [0.000]     
Outside investor rights -     -0.655 [0.000] -1.013 [0.000] 
Institutional ownership - -0.393 [0.000] -0.400 [0.000] -0.362 [0.000] -0.368 [0.000] 
Number of analysts - -0.307 [0.000] -0.280 [0.000] -0.306 [0.000] -0.280 [0.000] 
Audit - -1.909 [0.000] -2.092 [0.000] -2.034 [0.000] -2.228 [0.000] 
Amihud liquidity ratio - -0.087 [0.000] -0.081 [0.000] -0.089 [0.000] -0.084 [0.000] 
IFRS/GAAP -   -1.159 [0.000]   -1.236 [0.000] 
          
Adjusted-R2   0.689   0.699   0.684   0.694   
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Table 16 Country Level Regression Analysis of Earnings Management with GMM Estimation 
 
The dependent variable is the aggregate earnings management (). The aggregate earnings management score is calculated by taking the 
average of the country rankings for three earnings management measures, EM1-EM3. Legal origin () classifies countries into Common law, 
Scandinavian civil law, French civil law, and German civil law and is based on La Porta et al. (1998). Outside investor rights () is an 
anti-director rights index developed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). Institutional ownership () is defined as the 
sum of all institutional holdings in a firm’s stock divided by market capitalization and is from Ferreira and Matos (2008). Number of analysts () 
is the average number of financial analysts following the companies in a country. Audit () measures the degree of audit quality. Both number 
of analysts and audit are based upon Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2003). The Amihud liquidity ratio () is defined as the inverse of 
|5| 1 $758888888888888888888 1 10

. IFRS/GAAP is a dummy variable that equal to one for IFRS and zero for U.S. GAAP. There are total 34 country-level 
observations. The subscript , represents the  ,*+ country and  is the error term. 
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable 
Predicted 
sign Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Constant   30.206 [0.000] 36.320 [0.000] 54.831 [0.000] 57.235 [0.000] 
Legal origin - -3.100 [0.001] -2.916 [0.020]     
Outside investor rights -     -3.753 [0.011] -4.111 [0.009] 
Institutional ownership - -0.440 [0.004] -0.420 [0.000] -0.613 [0.000] -0.574 [0.000] 
Number of analysts - -0.545 [0.000] -0.352 [0.000] -0.455 [0.000] -0.437 [0.000] 
Audit - -4.294 [0.005] -5.301 [0.000] -3.682 [0.000] -4.107 [0.000] 
Amihud liquidity ratio - -0.043 [0.000] -0.033 [0.000] -0.043 [0.000] -0.039 [0.000] 
IFRS/GAAP -   -0.430 [0.000]   -0.394 [0.001] 
          
Adjusted-R2   0.590   0.603   0.585   0.596   
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estimations confirm the above conclusions, as displayed in Table 16. The interaction term 
analysis is not performed for the country-level analysis due to small (country-level) data points.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This study investigates the relationship between earnings management and investor 
protection, market monitoring, and liquidity using the sample of the 432 cross-listed firms across 
34 countries over the period of 2000-2009. The method of constructing the aggregate earnings 
management index is based upon Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003).  
Main findings are described as follows. First, cross-listed firms in countries with strong legal 
system, strong outside investor rights, more institutional shareholders, more financial analysts 
following, and more firms audited by the largest five accounting firms are less likely to engage 
in earnings management. This finding is largely consistent using both firm-level and country-
level aggregate earnings management and also evident either after controlling for a potential 
industry effect. Second, cross-listed firms with low stock liquidity tend to manipulate earnings 
than those with high liquidity. Third, cross-listed firms adopting IFRS have lower propensity in 
earnings management than those following U.S. GAAP.  
Other results indicate that the degree of earnings management is less for statements 
reported in the U.S. than those reported in the home countries and that cross-listed firms have 
higher earnings management in the pre-listing period than in the post-listing period. These two 
results can be explained by U.S. being the country where the combined level of investor 
protection, market development, and institutional holdings is the strongest In addition, foreign 
firms cross-list shares on the U.S. major stock market have lower propensity to engage in 
41 
 
earnings management than those listed in the OTC market, which is consistent with regulatory 
requirements on major exchanges being stricter.  
This paper contributes to the literature that in addition to legal enforcement and outside 
investor rights, market monitoring (institutional holdings, number of analysts, and audit quality) 
and liquidity are also important in explaining the variation in earnings management. Particularly, 
liquidity plays a influential role in reducing earnings management after controlling for legal 
protection and market monitoring. The differences in earnings management between home 
shares and ADR shares and between pre and post listing periods further reinforce the importance 
of market monitoring and liquidity in earnings management. 
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6. Appendix A The Progress of IFRS 
 
Country Status for listed companies as of April 2010 
Argentina Required for fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2011 
Australia Required for all private sector reporting entities and as the basis for public sector 
reporting since 2005  
Brazil Required for consolidated financial statements of banks and listed companies 
from 31 December 2010 and for individual company accounts progressively 
since January 2008 
Canada Required from 1 January 2011 for all listed entities and permitted for private 
sector entities including not-for-profit organizations 
China Substantially converged national standards 
European Union All member states of the EU are required to use IFRSs as adopted by the EU for 
listed companies since 2005 
France Required via EU adoption and implementation process since 2005 
Germany Required via EU adoption and implementation process since 2005 
India India is converging with IFRSs over a period beginning 1 April 2011 
Indonesia  Convergence process ongoing; a decision about a target date for full compliance 
with IFRSs is expected to be made in 2012 
Italy Required via EU adoption and implementation process since 2005 
Japan Permitted from 2010 for a number of international companies; decision about 
mandatory adoption by 2016 expected around 2012 
Mexico Required from 2012 
Republic of Korea Required from 2011 
Russia Required for banking institutions and some other securities issuers; permitted for 
other companies 
Saudi Arabia Not permitted for listed companies 
South Africa Required for listed entities since 2005 
Turkey Required for listed entities since 2008 
United Kingdom Required via EU adoption and implementation process since 2005 
United States Allowed for foreign issuers in the US since 2007; target date for substantial 
convergence with IFRSs is 2011 and decision about possible adoption for US 
companies expected in 2011 
Source: IFRS.org website 
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7. Appendix B Characteristics of Home Countries for Cross-listed Firms 
 
Country Region Legal origin Legal 
enforcement 
Outside 
investor 
rights 
Importance of 
equity market 
Institutional 
holdings (%) 
Disclosure Analysts Audit 
Argentina America 
Emerging 
French 5.79 2.00 20.58 NA 45 12.73 NA 
Australia Asia 
Developed 
Common 9.51 4.00 59.68 9.20 75 12.30 4 
Bermuda NA Common NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Brazil America 
Emerging 
French 6.13 5.00 13.63 NA 54 16.10 3 
Cayman 
Islands 
NA Common NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Chile America 
Emerging 
French 6.52 4.00 35.64 NA 52 5.53 4 
China Asia 
Emerging 
German NA 1.00 22.11 NA NA NA NA 
Denmark Europe 
Developed 
Scandinavian 10.00 4.00 33.05 20.50 62 12.87 4 
Finland Europe 
Developed 
Scandinavian 10.00 3.50 69.83 33.80 77 14.90 4 
France Europe  
Developed 
French 8.68 3.50 35.18 21.10 69 23.20 3 
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Appendix B continued 
Country Region Legal origin Legal 
enforcement 
Outside 
investor 
rights 
Importance of 
equity market 
Institutional 
holdings (%) 
Disclosure Analysts Audit 
Germany Europe 
Developed 
German 9.05 3.50 22.67 21.00 62 32.40 4 
Greece Europe  
Developed 
French 6.82 2.00 43.29 10.20 55 6.10 1 
Hong Kong Asia 
Developed 
Common 8.91 5.00 166.43 10.90 69 25.00 4 
India Asia 
Emerging 
Common 5.58 5.00 13.33 15.90 57 11.90 1 
Indonesia Asia 
Emerging 
French 2.88 4.00 9.28 NA NA NA NA 
Ireland Europe 
Developed 
Common 8.36 5.00 30.54 30.50 NA 5.43 4 
Israel Middle 
East 
Developed 
Common 7.72 4.00 50.38 NA 64 3.19 2 
Italy Europe 
Developed 
French 7.07 2.00 21.21 13.60 62 21.57 4 
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Appendix B continued 
Country Region Legal origin Legal 
enforcement 
Outside 
investor 
rights 
Importance of 
equity market 
Institutional 
holdings (%) 
Disclosure Analysts Audit 
Japan Asia 
Developed 
German 9.17 4.50 31.02 10.80 65 14.87 4 
Korea Asia 
Emerging 
German NA 4.50 29.62 NA NA 9.90 3 
Luxembourg NA French NA 2.00 128.98 20.40 NA 0.00 4 
Mexico America 
Emerging 
French 5.37 3.00 7.94 NA 60 18.53 3 
Netherlands Europe 
Developed 
French 10.00 2.50 48.90 32.40 64 29.53 4 
New Zealand Asia 
Developed 
Common 10.00 4.00 25.68 NA 70 8.87 4 
Norway Europe 
Developed 
Scandinavian 10.00 3.50 27.37 21.10 74 12.83 4 
Portugal Europe 
Developed 
French 7.19 2.50 19.11 9.00 36 5.33 3 
Russia Europe, 
Emerging 
German NA 4.00 17.34 NA NA NA NA 
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Appendix B continued 
Country Region Legal origin Legal 
enforcement 
Outside 
investor 
rights 
Importance of 
equity market 
Institutional 
holdings (%) 
Disclosure Analysts Audit 
Singapore Asia 
Developed 
Common 8.93 5.00 90.41 10.80 78 20.90 4 
South Africa Africa 
Emerging 
Common 6.45 5.00 56.15 11.20 70 7.40 4 
Spain Europe 
Developed 
French 7.14 5.00 42.75 16.60 64 22.73 4 
Sweden Europe 
Developed 
Scandinavian 10.00 3.50 49.99 33.80 83 20.60 4 
Switzerland Europe 
Developed 
German 10.00 3.00 97.34 22.90 68 19.97 3 
Taiwan Asia 
Emerging 
German 7.37 3.00 45.92 28.20 65 6.80 2 
United 
Kingdom 
Europe 
Developed 
Common 9.22 5.00 67.37 20.10 78 20.10 4 
Note: NA represents that the data is not available. 
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8. Appendix C Measures of Earnings Management by Region 
 
The method of computing earnings management measures is based on Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003). 
Earnings management 1 (EM1) is calculated as a ratio of the firm-level standard deviation of operating 
earnings over the firm-level standard deviation of cash flow from operations in the sample period. 
Earnings management 2 (EM2) is the Spearman correlation between changes in accruals and changes in 
operating cash flow for each firm. Earnings management 3 (EM3) is a firm’s median of the absolute value 
of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flow from operations.  The aggregate earnings 
management score (aggregate EM) is calculated by taking the average of the firm rankings for these three 
earnings management measures. According to the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), 
countries are classified into five regions, American Emerging, Asia Developed, Asia Emerging, Europe 
Developed, and Europe Emerging, Israel, and South Africa. Since Bermuda, Cayman Islands, and 
Luxembourg are excluded from the region classification of the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI), the number of firms in the analysis is 416 across 31 countries over the period of 2000 to 2009. 
 
Region by MSCI 
Number of 
firms EM1 EM2 EM3 
Aggregate 
EM 
America Emerging 75 0.000 -0.900 0.559 182.333 
Asia Developed 73 0.000 -0.800 0.550 197.333 
Asia Emerging 36 0.000 -0.717 0.679 212.667 
Europe Developed 215 0.001 -0.850 0.612 163.667 
Europe Emerging, Israel, 
and South Africa 17 0.000 -0.738 0.549 163.000 
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9. Appendix D Correlation of Earnings Management, Investor Protection, and Market Monitoring 
 
Variables are from 432 cross-listed firms across 34 countries over the period of 2000 to 2009. The aggregate earnings management score 
(aggregate EM) is calculated by taking the average of the firm rankings for three earnings management measures, EM1-EM3. Legal origin is based 
upon La Porta et al. (1998). Legal enforcement is measured by three measures: (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) rule of law, and (3) the 
corruption index. Outside investor rights is an anti-director rights index. Importance of equity market is composed by three variables: 1) the ratio 
of the aggregate stock market capitalization held by minority shareholders to gross national product, 2) the ratio of listed domestic firms to the 
population, and 3) the ratio of IPOs to the population. Institutional ownership is defined as the sum of all institutional holdings in a firm’s stock 
divided by market capitalization. Ownership concentration is the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in 
the ten largest nonfinancial and privately owned domestic firms. Disclosure is an index and evaluated by seven categories, including general 
information, income statement, balance sheets, cash flow statement, accounting standards, stock data, and special item. Number of analysts is the 
number of financial analysts following the companies in a country. Audit measures the degree of audit quality.  
 
Variable  
Aggregate 
EM 
Legal 
origin 
Legal 
enforcement 
Outside 
investor 
rights 
Importance 
of equity 
market 
Institutional 
ownership Disclosure 
Number of 
analysts Audit 
Legal origin 
-0.122         
[0.000]         
Legal 
enforcement 
-0.092 0.412        
[0.000] [0.000]        
Outside investor 
rights 
-0.033 0.531 0.005       
[0.089] [0.000] [0.819]       
Importance of 
equity market 
-0.155 0.488 0.489 0.219      
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]      
Institutional 
ownership 
-0.191 -0.378 0.336 -0.444 -0.026     
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.250]     
Disclosure 
-0.142 0.617 0.675 0.376 0.571 0.199    
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Number of 
analysts 
-0.112 -0.073 0.447 -0.135 0.109 0.381 0.266   
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
Audit 
-0.079 0.249 0.557 0.208 0.291 -0.029 0.411 0.296  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.202] [0.000] [0.000]  
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10. Appendix E Correlation of Earnings Management and Control Variables 
 
Variables of control variables are computed from 432 cross-listed firms across 34 countries over the 
period of 2000 to 2009. The aggregate earnings management score (aggregate EM) is calculated by taking 
the average of the firm rankings for three earnings management measures, EM1-EM3. Earnings 
management 1 (EM1) is calculated as a ratio of the firm-level standard deviation of operating earnings 
over the firm-level standard deviation of cash flow from operations in the sample period. Earnings 
management 2 (EM2) is the Spearman correlation between changes in accruals and changes in operating 
cash flow for each firm. Earnings management 3 (EM3) is a firm’s median of the absolute value of 
accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flow from operations.  Amihud illiquidity ratio is defined as 
|5| 1 $758888888888888888888 1 10

, where the bar on top of the ratio is the notation for the average. The Amihud 
illiquidity ratio is the average of daily price impact ratios, and then scaled by 1 million. Market to book is 
the market value of equity over the book value of equity at the end of firm year. Total assets is the 
logarithm of total assets. Debt-to-equity ratio is a ratio of total liabilities over total stockholder’s equity.  
 
 Variable 
 Aggregate 
EM 
Amihud 
illiquidity  
ratio 
Market to 
book Total assets 
Debt-to-
equity ratio 
Amihud illiquidity  ratio 0.140         
[0.000]     
Market to book 0.035 -0.003    
[0.065] [0.867]    
Total assets 0.318 -0.097 -0.073   
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
Debt-to-equity ratio 
-0.015 0.065 -0.016 -0.026  
[0.423] [0.001] [0.396] [0.169]   
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11. Appendix F Univariate Analysis of Home country (Home) and the U.S. Market (ADR): 
By country 
 
Each earnings management measure is computed from 432 cross-listed firms across 34 countries over the 
period of 2000 to 2009. The method of computing earnings management measures is based on Leuz, 
Nanda, and Wysocki (2003). Earnings management 1 (EM1) is calculated as a ratio of the country-level 
standard deviation of operating earnings over the country-level standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations in the sample period. Earnings management 2 (EM2) is the Spearman correlation between 
changes in accruals and changes in operating cash flow for each country. Earnings management 3 (EM3) 
is a country’s median of the absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flow from 
operations. The difference is tested by the t-test. P-value indicates the significance of the difference.  
 
Country  EM measures ADR Home Difference P-value 
    (1) (2) (1)-(2)   
Argentina EM1 0.713 0.002 0.711 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.578 -0.605 0.027 [0.165] 
 EM3 0.586 0.638 -0.052 [0.016] 
Australia EM1 0.705 -0.018 0.723 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.535 -0.676 0.141 [0.106] 
  EM3 0.524 0.535 -0.011 [0.092] 
Bermuda EM1 0.584 0.001 0.583 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.607 -0.910 0.303 [0.081] 
 EM3 0.821 2.052 -1.231 [0.012] 
Brazil EM1 0.733 0.001 0.732 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.476 -0.900 0.424 [0.000] 
  EM3 0.510 0.702 -0.193 [0.000] 
Cayman Islands EM1 0.327 0.001 0.326 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.852 -0.603 -0.249 [0.003] 
 EM3 0.896 1.141 -0.246 [0.000] 
Chile EM1 0.797 0.001 0.796 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.429 -0.925 0.495 [0.000] 
  EM3 0.579 0.512 0.067 [0.771] 
China EM1 0.636 0.000 0.636 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.706 -0.539 -0.167 [0.000] 
 EM3 0.682 0.637 0.045 [0.201] 
Denmark EM1 0.960 0.001 0.959 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.295 -0.570 0.275 [0.008] 
  EM3 0.748 0.351 0.397 [0.006] 
Finland EM1 0.880 0.001 0.879 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.468 -0.860 0.391 [0.000] 
 EM3 0.510 0.749 -0.239 [0.005] 
France EM1 0.778 -0.008 0.786 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.434 -0.839 0.405 [0.000] 
  EM3 0.500 0.760 -0.261 [0.000] 
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Appendix F continued 
Country  EM measures ADR Home Difference P-value 
   (1) (2) (1)-(2)  
Germany EM1 0.782 0.005 0.777 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.465 -0.731 0.267 [0.000] 
 EM3 0.520 0.723 -0.203 [0.000] 
Greece EM1 0.853 0.000 0.853 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.472 -0.874 0.401 [0.002] 
  EM3 0.343 0.661 -0.318 [0.007] 
Hong Kong EM1 0.801 0.000 0.800 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.506 -0.759 0.253 [0.003] 
 EM3 0.628 0.508 0.119 [0.687] 
India EM1 0.910 0.000 0.910 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.399 -0.933 0.534 [0.002] 
  EM3 0.636 0.643 -0.008 [0.000] 
Indonesia EM1 0.690 0.000 0.690 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.569 -0.852 0.283 [0.036] 
 EM3 0.601 1.465 -0.863 [0.000] 
Ireland EM1 0.731 0.039 0.692 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.550 -0.502 -0.048 [0.126] 
  EM3 0.743 2.697 -1.955 [0.000] 
Israel EM1 0.798 0.008 0.790 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.466 -0.615 0.149 [0.012] 
 EM3 0.519 0.774 -0.255 [0.000] 
Italy EM1 0.652 0.000 0.652 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.550 -0.868 0.317 [0.000] 
  EM3 0.542 0.569 -0.026 [0.000] 
Japan EM1 0.800 0.000 0.800 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.388 -0.755 0.366 [0.000] 
 EM3 0.449 0.638 -0.189 [0.000] 
Korea EM1 0.728 0.000 0.728 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.472 -0.723 0.251 [0.000] 
  EM3 0.597 0.675 -0.078 [0.000] 
Luxembourg EM1 0.560 -0.001 0.561 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.745 -0.569 -0.176 [0.000] 
 EM3 0.789 0.981 -0.193 [0.000] 
Mexico EM1 0.678 0.001 0.677 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.604 -0.712 0.108 [0.000] 
  EM3 0.640 0.756 -0.116 [0.000] 
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Appendix F continued 
Country  EM measures ADR Home Difference P-value 
    (1) (2) (1)-(2)   
Netherlands EM1 0.861 -0.052 0.913 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.415 -0.654 0.239 [0.000] 
 EM3 0.423 0.757 -0.334 [0.000] 
New Zealand EM1 0.575 0.001 0.574 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.565 -0.358 -0.208 [0.443] 
  EM3 0.749 0.473 0.276 [0.056] 
Norway EM1 0.724 0.002 0.722 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.332 -0.470 0.138 [0.000] 
 EM3 0.450 0.632 -0.182 [0.000] 
Portugal EM1 0.773 0.000 0.773 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.643 -0.995 0.352 [0.000] 
  EM3 0.519 0.592 -0.073 [0.000] 
Russia EM1 0.748 0.000 0.747 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.520 -0.543 0.023 [0.010] 
 EM3 0.662 0.520 0.142 [0.567] 
Singapore EM1 0.652 0.012 0.640 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.639 -0.396 -0.243 [1.000] 
  EM3 0.806 0.945 -0.138 [0.005] 
South Africa EM1 0.678 0.000 0.678 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.575 -0.735 0.160 [0.000] 
 EM3 0.759 0.815 -0.055 [0.000] 
Spain EM1 0.942 0.000 0.941 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.134 -0.751 0.617 [0.000] 
  EM3 0.236 0.515 -0.279 [0.000] 
Sweden EM1 0.720 0.002 0.719 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.561 -0.714 0.153 [0.000] 
 EM3 0.618 0.693 -0.076 [0.000] 
Switzerland EM1 0.816 0.003 0.813 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.368 -0.877 0.509 [0.000] 
  EM3 0.416 0.519 -0.103 [0.000] 
Taiwan EM1 0.770 0.000 0.770 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.353 -0.482 0.129 [0.000] 
 EM3 0.687 0.722 -0.035 [0.000] 
United Kingdom EM1 0.769 1.015 -0.246 [0.000] 
 EM2 -0.388 -0.606 0.219 [0.000] 
  EM3 0.504 0.717 -0.213 [0.000] 
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12. Appendix G Comparison of Pre-listing Period and Post-listing Period by Country 
 
The method of computing earnings management measures is based on Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003). 
Earnings management 1 (EM1) is calculated as a ratio of the country-level standard deviation of operating 
earnings over the country-level standard deviation of cash flow from operations in the sample period. 
Earnings management 2 (EM2) is the Spearman correlation between changes in accruals and changes in 
operating cash flow for each country. Earnings management 3 (EM3) is a country’s median of the 
absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flow from operations. Difference is the 
earnings management measure of the Post-listing minus the earnings management measure of the Pre-
listing. The difference is tested by the t-test. P-value indicates the significance of the difference.  
 
Country  EM measures Post-listing Pre-listing Difference P-value 
   (1) (2) (1)-(2)  
Argentina EM1 0.0009 0.0000 0.0009 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.6367 -0.7831 0.1464 [0.0000] 
 EM3 0.6498 0.7452 -0.0954 [0.0000] 
Australia EM1 0.0054 0.0023 0.0031 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.6697 -0.9014 0.2317 [0.0000] 
  EM3 0.4779 0.5352 -0.0573 [0.0000] 
Bermuda EM1 0.0008 0.0020 -0.0012 [0.1637] 
 EM2 -0.8334 -0.8792 0.0458 [0.0000] 
 EM3 0.5027 0.6653 -0.1626 [0.0000] 
Brazil EM1 0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.8953 -0.9553 0.0600 [0.0000] 
  EM3 0.6855 0.9485 -0.2630 [0.0000] 
Cayman Islands EM1 0.0212 -0.0387 0.0599 [0.0150] 
 EM2 -0.6318 -1.0000 0.3682 [0.0000] 
 EM3 1.0495 1.2921 -0.2426 [0.0000] 
Chile EM1 0.0012 0.0062 -0.0050 [0.6599] 
 EM2 -0.9245 -0.8180 -0.1065 [0.9887] 
  EM3 0.8575 0.8648 -0.0073 [0.7709] 
China EM1 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.5392 -1.0000 0.4608 [0.0000] 
 EM3 0.9125 1.8435 -0.9311 [0.0000] 
Denmark EM1 0.0006 0.0000 0.0006 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.5704 -1.0000 0.4296 [0.0000] 
  EM3 0.3512 0.2989 0.0523 [0.1914] 
Finland EM1 0.0007 0.0003 0.0004 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.7457 -0.9985 0.2528 [0.0000] 
 EM3 0.7311 0.7861 -0.0551 [0.0000] 
France EM1 0.0010 0.0001 0.0009 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.8080 -0.8408 0.0328 [0.0000] 
  EM3 0.6695 0.7021 -0.0326 [0.0000] 
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Appendix G continued 
Country  EM measures Post-listing Pre-listing Difference P-value 
    (1) (2) (1)-(2)   
Germany EM1 0.0047 -0.0401 0.0449 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.7315 -0.9663 0.2348 [0.0000] 
 EM3 1.3134 1.0520 0.2614 [0.0440] 
Greece EM1 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.8736 -1.0000 0.1264 [0.0000] 
  EM3 0.6908 1.0649 -0.3741 [0.0000] 
Hong Kong EM1 0.0005 0.0000 0.0005 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.7590 -0.9667 0.2077 [0.0000] 
 EM3 0.6696 1.8240 -1.1543 [0.0000] 
India EM1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.9333 -1.0000 0.0667 [0.0000] 
  EM3 0.5701 2.8721 -2.3021 [0.0770] 
Indonesia EM1 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 [0.3640] 
 EM2 -0.8566 -0.9643 0.1077 [0.0000] 
 EM3 1.5108 0.3997 1.1111 [0.3253] 
Ireland EM1 0.0551 0.0237 0.0314 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.5450 -0.5565 0.0115 [0.0000] 
  EM3 0.4794 0.4839 -0.0045 [0.0000] 
Israel EM1 0.0126 0.0077 0.0048 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.5224 -0.9152 0.3928 [0.0390] 
 EM3 1.2675 3.1810 -1.9135 [0.0000] 
Italy EM1 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.8675 -0.9792 0.1117 [0.0341] 
  EM3 0.6689 1.0005 -0.3316 [0.0000] 
Japan EM1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.7548 -0.9587 0.2039 [0.0000] 
 EM3 0.6380 0.6970 -0.0589 [0.0000] 
Korea EM1 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.7233 -0.8125 0.0892 [0.0000] 
  EM3 0.6749 0.6759 -0.0011 [0.0000] 
Luxembourg EM1 0.0025 0.0023 0.0002 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.4133 -0.7294 0.3161 [0.0000] 
  EM3 0.7136 0.8136 -0.0999 [0.0000] 
Mexico EM1 0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.6921 -0.9444 0.2523 [0.0000] 
  EM3 0.5282 0.6199 -0.0917 [0.0000] 
Netherlands EM1 0.0020 0.0009 0.0012 [0.0010] 
 EM2 -0.6418 -0.8499 0.2081 [0.0000] 
 EM3 0.6220 0.6793 -0.0573 [0.0000] 
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Appendix G continued 
Country  EM measures Post-listing Pre-listing Difference P-value 
    (1) (2) (1)-(2)   
New Zealand EM1 0.0009 -0.0017 0.0026 [0.0021] 
 EM2 -0.3576 -0.3766 0.0190 [0.9635] 
  EM3 0.5795 0.3829 0.1966 [0.1458] 
Norway EM1 0.0018 -0.0008 0.0027 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.4701 -0.6571 0.1871 [0.0027] 
 EM3 0.7084 2.1549 -1.4465 [0.0000] 
Portugal EM1 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.9947 -1.0000 0.0053 [0.0000] 
 EM3 0.5924 0.9644 -0.3720 [0.0000] 
Russia EM1 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.5432 -0.9167 0.3735 [0.0000] 
  EM3 0.5202 0.8992 -0.3790 [0.0570] 
South Africa EM1 0.0001 -0.0062 0.0063 [0.2611] 
 EM2 -0.7349 -0.3418 -0.3932 [0.2230] 
 EM3 0.8146 0.5891 0.2255 [0.3634] 
Spain EM1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 [0.0050] 
 EM2 -0.7511 -0.8659 0.1148 [0.0750] 
  EM3 0.6796 0.7809 -0.1013 [0.0000] 
Sweden EM1 0.0016 0.0012 0.0004 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.7137 -0.8846 0.1710 [0.0000] 
 EM3 2.8474 2.4689 0.3785 [0.0000] 
Switzerland EM1 0.0034 0.0031 0.0003 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.8770 -0.8896 0.0126 [0.0000] 
  EM3 1.1296 0.8201 0.3095 [0.3095] 
Taiwan EM1 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.4821 -1.0000 0.5179 [0.0009] 
 EM3 0.9586 1.1114 -0.1529 [0.0000] 
United Kingdom EM1 1.0155 -0.3856 1.4011 [0.0000] 
 EM2 -0.6064 -0.7644 0.1580 [0.0000] 
  EM3 3.2046 1.5357 1.6690 [0.6576] 
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Essay Two 
Does A More Liquid Currency Futures Market Tend to Be More Informative?  
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the relative contribution by Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME) and Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) to the price discovery process of EURO/USD 
futures contracts.  Moreover, this paper tests whether the information share can be explained by 
trading characteristics, including volume, quoted bid-ask spread, and price volatility.  The 
hypothesis is that a liquid market is also more informative.11  The underlying rationale is that, if 
most of the liquidity and trading is generated by informed traders, then greater liquidity means 
greater information production.  Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) theorize that informed traders tend 
to trade in more liquid markets.  However, if liquidity is mostly generated by noise traders, then 
greater liquidity does not necessarily translate into more or better information, thus our 
hypothesis might not hold.12  The EURO/USD currency futures accounted for one third of all 
currency futures contracts traded on CME and ICE in 2009, and the two markets trade identical 
contracts and employ similar trading mechanisms.  However, liquidity varies substantially 
between these two markets.  Hence, any differences in information production arguably could be 
largely attributed to differences in liquidity.   
                                                          
11 Easley and O’Hara (1987) argue that the speed of price adjustment is determined by market size, dept, 
volume, and variance. Higher trading volume or greater depth may slow the speed of price adjustment. In 
turn, market liquidity does affect price discovery. Lyons (1997) argues the “hot potato” effect increases 
inventory. From the market microstructure point of view, inventory is one of components to determine 
bid-ask spread. Therefore, liquidity is a factor of price determination. 
12 Noise traders enhance the market liquidity, but make the information discovery process longer. See, for 
example, Kyle (1985). French and Roll (1986) present evidence that suggests the influence of noise 
trading is non-trivial. 
61 
 
Rather than comparing two futures markets, prior related studies focus on the interaction 
between spot and futures markets.  The linkage between liquidity and information share has been 
documented by Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and Kehrie and Peter (2010) using the sample of the 
US-listed Canadian stocks and US Treasury futures, respectively.  Poskitt (2009) examines price 
discovery in the electronic Sterling/ US currency futures and spot markets; the evidence shows 
that time-varying liquidity can explain the time-varying information shares in the Globex market.  
Using Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share approach and Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) 
common factor weight approach, Chen and Gau (2010) analyze the macroeconomics news effect 
on price discovery in EURO/USD and JPY/USD currency futures and on-line spot markets.  
Around the announcement of macroeconomic news, more informed traders are more likely to 
engage in futures market and thereby price discovery in futures market is higher than spot market.  
The findings in Poskitt (2009) and Chen and Gau (2010) imply that the futures market is the 
leader in price discovery and information share.  However, futures involve higher leverage than 
spot transactions, hence comparison of liquidity of spot and futures markets is ambiguous.  In 
contrast to Poskitt (2009) and Chen and Gau (2010), we compare two futures markets and we 
consider this a more direct test of the relation between liquidity and information discovery.  
Microstructure studies, such as Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), suggest that liquidity has multiple 
dimensions, so a single liquidity measure might not adequately capture liquidity.  Therefore, we 
utilize two liquidity measures, which include volume and quoted spread, to explain the variation 
of relative information share.   
In the present study, the contribution by CME and ICE to the price discovery process of 
EURO/USD is estimated by the information share approach of Hasbrouck (1995).  The intraday 
data in 2010 from CME and ICE is utilized to generate continuous series of quote midpoints over 
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the one-minute sampling interval. The information share is then estimated by a vector error 
correction model through the series of midquotes.  Empirical findings indicate that CME 
contributes substantially more to price discovery process than ICE.  In addition, the information 
share of CME is greater in the mornings than in the afternoons.  Variations in CME’s 
information share are partially explained by variations in volume, quoted spread, and price 
volatility.  The results support the liquidity hypothesis that a market with greater market depth 
and lower transaction cost contributes more to price discovery. The higher price volatility in the 
ICE market is another reason explaining the greater information share of CME.   
The next section describes the related literature, which is followed by section 3 that 
describes data.  Section 4 describes the methodologies, Section 5 discusses results, and Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Liquidity and Information Discovery 
Previous studies (Eun and Sabherwal, 2003; Foucault and Lescourret, 2003; Mizrach and 
Neely, 2008; Poskitt, 2009; Kehrie and Peter, 2010; Chen and Gau, 2010) indicate, both 
theoretically and empirically, a positive link between liquidity and information discovery. For 
instance, Foucault and Lescourret (2003) extend Kyle’s (1985) model to distinguish traders into 
uninformed traders, informed traders with fundamental information, and liquidity traders with 
non-fundamental information. With this theoretical framework, information discovered through 
trading improves market quality in terms of price volatility, information efficiency, market 
liquidity, and trading costs.  
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Empirically, some studies show a linkage between liquidity and information discovery. 
For example, Eun and Sabherwal (2003) examine price discovery for Canadian stocks listed on 
both the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and U.S. exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX). 
Price discovery is positively associated with the number of shares traded in the U.S. but 
negatively with transaction costs. As another example, Mizrach and Neely (2008) examine price 
discovery of the U.S. Treasury futures and conclude that liquidity measures, such as relative bid-
ask spread, number of trades, and realized volatility, explain roughly 21% of daily information 
share. In addition, comparing futures and options markets, Blasco, Corredor, and Santamaria 
(2007) document that the higher information spillover in futures market is attributed to higher 
liquidity and lower transaction costs. 
Two studies most related to the present paper are Chen and Gau (2010) and Poskitt 
(2009). Taking Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share and Gonzalo and Granger (1995) common 
factor weight approaches, Chen and Gau (2010) study how the spot and futures markets react to 
the US macroeconomics news in the JPY/USD and EURO/USD markets from 2004 to 2005. 
They find that information share is determined by market quality, including bid-ask spread, 
trading volume, and volatility. Around the announcement of macroeconomic news, more 
informed traders are more likely to engage in futures market and thereby price discovery in 
futures market is higher than spot market. When either spot market is volatile or futures market 
is liquid, futures market has higher contribution in price discovery. Poskitt (2009) investigates 
price discovery between the Globex futures and Reuters D3000 markets in the electronic 
Sterling/Dollar foreign currency trading system. The results show that Globex has a lower 
information share than Reuters D3000. Globex’s information share is positively related to the 
relative volume but negatively related to the relative spread and volatility.   
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2.2 Return and Volatility Spillovers 
Prior studies on information transmission and volatility and return spillovers are also 
related to the present study. Most of these investigate equity and commodity futures markets, and 
show that information influence returns from the most active to less active markets. For instance, 
studies document bi-directional transmissions between developed equity markets (e.g., Hamao, 
Masulis, and Ng, 1990; Koutmos and Booth, 1995; Wang and Firth, 2004), and uni-directional 
transmission from developed to emerging equity markets (Liu and Pan, 1997). In the wheat 
futures market, Booth, Brockman, and Tse (1998) examine whether the U.S. or the Canadian 
market is relatively informative. Yang, Zhang, and Leatham (2003) simultaneously examine 
wheat markets in the U.S., Canada, and London. Both studies conclude that the U.S. market is 
the dominant center of information production in the worldwide wheat market.  
Other papers, studying cross-listed stocks, present evidence of information transfer across 
countries.  Taking the approaches of information share suggested by Hasbrouck (1995) and 
Grammig et al. (2005), Frijns, Gilbert, and Tourani-Red (2010) and Binh, Chong, and Eom’s 
(2010) document that price discovery is dominant in home country. Frjins, Gilbert, and Tourani-
Red study cross-listed stocks between Australia and New Zealand stocks cross-listed in Australia. 
Binh, Chong, and Eom (2010) examine Korean stocks cross-listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
(TSE) and find that Korean market contributes more to price discovery.  
Evidence from other research indicates information transmission across countries and 
asset classes. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007) investigate the impact of U.S. 
macroeconomic news on U.S., German, and British stock, bond, and foreign exchange markets 
from July 1998 to December 2002, including the contraction and expansion periods. After 
controlling for news effect, Andersen et al. (2007) find a contemporaneous linkage cross markets 
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and countries.  Examining non-financial firms in North America and Europe, Forte and Peña 
(2009) analyze the price discovery among the stock, bond, and credit default swap (CDS) 
markets using the vector error correction model. They show that the stock market leads the bond 
and CDS markets. 
 
2.3 Currency Spot and Futures Markets 
Empirical research documents mixed results with regard to information transfer between 
currency futures and spot markets. Because of futures market’s attraction to informed traders, 
several studies argue that currency futures market is more informative than currency spot market 
[e.g., Garbade and Silber, 1983; Crain and Lee, 1995; Chartrath and Song, 1998; Martens and 
Kofman, 1998; Tse et al. 2006; Chen and Gau, 2010]. However, other studies indicate that the 
spot market is more informative than the futures market. For example, Rosenberg and Traub 
(2009) and Cabrera, Wang, and Yang (2009) find that spot market contributes more to the price 
discovery as the spot market become more transparent.  
Blasco, Corredor, and Santamaria (2007), Kim, Szakmary, and Schwarz (1999), Ates and 
Wang (2005), and Tse, Xiang, and Fung (2006) study the impact of trading platform on price 
discovery. In general, their results indicate that electronic trading systems achieve operational 
efficiency and lower order processing or transaction costs. Thus electronic trading provides more 
efficiency in price discovery than the floor trading in either the futures or spot markets. Their 
findings support the trading cost hypothesis that futures markets with lower transaction costs 
have higher contribution to price discovery. 
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3.  Data 
The data set used in this study is from the best bid or offer (BBO) intraday data of the 
EURO/USD futures traded on Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Intercontinental 
Exchange (ICE). The sample period covers from January 2010 to December 2010, with a total of 
252 trading days. We extracted the data from electronic trading as the study sample.   
Appendix A provides the specifications of EURO/USD futures contracts traded on CME 
and ICE. The EURO/USD futures contract traded on CME has a contract size of €125,000 with a 
minimum price fluctuation of $0.00005 per euro increments ($6.25/contract). The electronic 
trading is conducted on the CME Globex trading platform and runs from 1700 CST to 1600 CST 
(Central Standard Time) the next day, Sunday through Friday. The trading is closed at 1600 CST 
on Fridays and reopened on Sundays at 1700 CST. ICE trades the EURO/USD currency futures 
contracts in units of €125,000, with a minimum price fluctuation of $0.00005 per euro 
increments ($6.25/contract). The electronic trading hours are from 1700 CST to 1630 CST the 
next day. In sum, the contracts and trading mechanism are virtually identical. 
We apply the following criteria to filter the data: In each month, the most actively traded 
nearest-to-maturity contract was extracted. Five days prior to its expiration, the next-maturity 
contract was selected in the sample. The quotes must be two-sided, with a positive value of bid-
ask spread. The filtered data for CME include 285,701,517 quote observations, while that for 
ICE include 4,450,397 quote observations13. 
To access market contribution to price discovery, the data selected are from the 
overlapped trading hours in both exchanges. More specifically, we form time series of the futures 
midquotes from 1700 CST to 1600 CST next day during the period of January 2010 to December 
                                                          
13 Because of the thinness of actual trading in ICE, only quote data will be used in this study. 
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2010. Midquote returns are calculated from the time series of the prevailing futures midquote 
sampled at either one-minute or five- minute intervals. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the logarithm futures midquotes for CME and ICE 
at the one-minute interval. The price series in both markets show negative kurtosis, indicating a 
flat tail. The statistics of the Jarque-Bera (J-B) test indicate that the midquote series in two 
markets are not normally distributed. Table 2 reports the hourly average number of quotes on 
CME and ICE between 1700 CST and 1600 CST the following day over the sample period. The 
number of quotes rises steadily after opening hour, reaches the peak during 0800-1000 CST, and 
gradually declines before closing. On average, the level of quote activity is higher in the 
mornings (0000-1200 CST) than that in the afternoons (1200-2400 CST). This pattern suggests 
that more information comes into both markets in the mornings. On average, CME has a 
substantially large number of quotes as compared to ICE in the hourly interval.  
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics of Prices 
 
The table summarizes the one-minute logarithm futures midquotes of EURO/USD traded on CME and 
ICE. The notation *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 
  CME ICE 
Mean 0.282 0.283 
Std. dev. 0.045 0.045 
Skewness -0.285 -0.619 
Kurtosis -0.362 -0.550 
Jarque-Bera  6843.912***  7988.588*** 
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Table 2 Average Number of Quotes per Hour on CME and ICE 
 
This table reports the average number of quotes per hour of the EURO/USD futures contracts traded on 
CME and ICE. The sample period is from January 2010 to December 2010.  
 
Hour Beginning (HHMM) CME ICE 
2400 (CST)        1,440.8             977.5  
0100        2,001.6         1,010.5  
0200        2,770.2         1,050.3  
0300        2,623.0         1,051.8  
0400        2,366.4         1,052.8  
0500        2,485.5         1,036.6  
0600        2,821.5         1,010.5  
0700        3,614.9         1,050.2  
0800        3,965.6         1,098.5  
0900        4,203.8         1,087.9  
1000        3,813.1         1,060.4  
1100        2,948.4         1,033.3  
1200        2,738.1             990.3  
1300        2,753.1             961.2  
1400        1,709.8             714.9  
1500            197.0             197.5  
1700            253.6             260.5  
1800            281.9             307.9  
1900            750.4             573.5  
2000            849.9             623.1  
2100            847.9             641.7  
2200            843.7             648.4  
2300            971.4             707.8  
   
Morning    (2400-1200)      37,792.9       13,510.3  
Afternoon (1200-2400)        9,205.1         5,376.0  
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4. Methodologies 
4.1 Estimating Information Share 
The present study takes the approach of Hasbrouck (1995)14 to estimate the information 
share. This measure is based on the vector error correction model (VECM) developed by Engle 
and Granger (1987).  We formed time series of midquotes for EURO/USD futures traded on 
CME and ICE over the sample period in 2010. The unit root test for stationarity of midquote 
series is performed. Johansen’s (1988) method is employed to check whether the CME and ICE 
midquote series are co-integrated.  
The vector error correction model (VECM) is defined as: 
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where tCMEP ,∆  and tICEP ,∆  are the first log difference of the futures midquote for CME and ICE, 
respectively. ICEβ  is the co-integrated vector between the two markets such that 
1,1, −− + tICEICEtCMECME PP ββ  is co-integrated of order 1. Q  is the number of lags in the model based 
on multivariate Schwarz Bayesian criterion (Schwarz, 1978).  The coefficients of the error 
correction term CMEγ  and ICEγ (adjustment coefficients) indicate the responsiveness of the 
midquote series to any deviation from the equilibrium relationship. tCME ,ε  and  tICE ,ε  are the 
unautocorrelated residuals. 
                                                          
14
 Hasbrouck’s approach (1995) has been widely used to access information share: Mizrach and Neely 
(2008), Forte and Peña (2009), Poskitt (2009), Cabrera, Wang, and Yang (2009), Chen and Gau (2010), and 
Frjins, Gilbert, and Tourani-Red (2010). 
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Hasbrouck (1995) defines the information share of one market as the proportion of the 
variance of price innovation attributed to the variance of the innovation in the market of interest. 
The contribution of one market to the price discovery process (i.e., share in price discovery) is 
defined as:  
I. If the innovations  are not correlated, the information share of the CME market is   
IS = 2222
22
CMEICEICECME
CMEICE
σγσγ
σγ
+
 (eq. 3) 
 where CMEσ , ICEσ , and CIσ are estimated from the residual covariance matrix of the 
VECM. 
 
II. If the innovations are correlated, Hasbrouck (1995) derives the upper and lower 
information share bounds. According to Ballie et al. (2002), the mean of the upper and 
lower bounds is a reasonable estimate of a market’s information share. 
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The subscripts UB and LB denote upper and lower bounds, respectively. A higher value 
of IS indicates a larger contribution from the CME market.15   
 
 
                                                          
15  A similar model is by Gonzalo and Granger (1995), so-called common factor component model. 
However, Baillie, Booth, Tse, and Zabotina (2002) and De Jong (2002) both show that the two models are 
closely related and complement each other.  
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4.2.  Role of Trading Characteristics on Information Share 
Chowdhry and Nanda’s (1991) theory implies that informed traders tend to trade in more 
liquid markets.  Liquid markets are often characterized as markets with high trading volume and 
lower transaction costs.  Thus, we examine how trading characteristics, such as trading volume 
and transaction costs, influence a market’s contribution to price discovery.  In this study, we use 
volume of quotes as a proxy for trading activity as suggested by Poskitt (2009).  Bid-ask spread, 
a common liquidity measure, is used as a proxy for transaction cost.  Chen and Gau (2010) and 
Mizrach and Neely (2008), and Capelle-Blancard (2001) document that higher uncertainty 
inhibits price discovery.  The level of uncertainty, proxied by price volatility, is therefore 
included in the analysis.   
A regression model is used to analyze whether these trading characteristics influence a 
market’s contribution to price discovery: 
kkkkkkk timeDVolatilitySpreadVolumecISIS εββββ ++++∆+=− _)ln()ln()ln()]1/(ln[ 4321
 
(eq. 6) 
where ISk denotes the information share of the CME market during the k-hour interval and c is a 
constant. Volume is the relative volume of quotes computed as the ratio of volume on CME to 
the volume on ICE during the k-hour interval 16 . Ln denotes logarithm. ∆ represents the 
difference between current and previous 12-hour intervals. Spread is the ratio of quoted spread 
on CME over the quoted spread on ICE at the end of the k-hour interval. Volatility is the 
standard deviation of prices (midquotes) on ICE to the standard deviation of prices (midquotes) 
on CME during the k-hour interval. k denotes the 12-hour interval. D_time is a time dummy 
variable; D_timek = 1 if interval k is in the morning (0000– 1200 CST), otherwise D_timek = 0 
(1200– 2400 CST).  
                                                          
16
 Because of the thinness of actual trading in ICE, volume of quotes is used as a proxy for trading activity.  
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The level of trading activity is a proxy for how active a market is. A positive association 
between volume and information share is expected. The trading cost hypothesis suggests that the 
market with lower bid-ask spread is more likely to attract more informed trading (Fleming, 
Ostdiek, and Whaley, 1996; De Jong and Donders, 1998; Kim, Szakmary, and Schwarx, 1999; 
Eun and Sabherwal, 2003; Hsieh, Lee, and Yuan, 2008). A negative association between spread 
and information share is expected. High uncertainty inhibits price discovery. The higher 
volatility of ICE likely leads to less contribution to price discovery, implying a relatively larger 
information share for CME.  
 
5. Results 
Table 3 reports the mean and median information shares for full sample, morning, and 
afternoon over the one- and five-minute sampling intervals. Panel A of Table 3 shows the 
statistics for one-minute sampling interval. CME accounts for 87% contribution to the price 
discovery (ICE contributes 13%). The implication is that CME reflects information more 
efficiently compared to ICE. Recall that (Table 2) trading is much more active in CME than in 
ICE, and therefore the initial result is consistent with the notion that a more liquid market is also 
a more informative one. The contribution level of 91% in the morning is greater than that of 82% 
in the afternoon. The statistics of t test for the difference in means and medians of contribution 
levels between morning and afternoon are significant at 1% level. According to Easley and 
O'Hara (1987), there is a higher fraction of informed trades in the pre-open due to overnight 
accumulation of information. Therefore, concentrated trading in the morning allows prices to 
reach the equilibrium quickly and efficiently. Also, recall the results from Table 2, activity tends 
to be more intense in the morning for either exchange, but note that CME’s trading is even more 
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dominant in the morning (Table 2 shows that, in the morning sections, CME’s activity is more 
than twice of that of ICE; in the afternoon, activity in CME is less than twice of ICE). In sum, it 
is clear that CME has higher information share than ICE, especially in the mornings. Panel B of 
Table 3 presents the statistics of five-minute sampling interval. The findings are consistent with 
those shown in Panel A. Again, CME has a higher contribution to price discovery than ICE. 
Figure 1 displays the logarithm of information share for CME over ICE under the one minute 
sampling interval in 2010. The logarithm of information share for CME over ICE is positive in 
most of the sample period. The evidence provided in Figure 1 indicates that CME dominates 
price discovery in the EURO/USD futures market. Therefore, the results are fairly robust with 
respect to sampling intervals. 
 
Table 3 Information Shares of CME 
 
The sample period is from January 2010 to December 2010. The number of observations in the one-
minute sampling interval is 231,868 while that in the five-minute sampling interval is 53,610. Information 
shares are computed from the vector error correction model (VECM) suggested by Hasbrouck (1995). 
The null hypotheses test whether the information shares in the mornings and afternoons are the same. The 
mean and median differences are tested based on the t-statistics. The notation *** denotes the significance 
level at 1%.  
 
  All Day Morning Afternoon Difference 
Panel A: One-minute sampling interval     
Mean 0.865 0.906 0.822 0.084*** 
Median 0.993 0.999 0.969 0.031*** 
     
Panel B: Five-minute sampling interval     
Mean 0.873 0.925 0.818 0.107*** 
Median 0.993 0.999 0.959 0.041*** 
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Figure 1 Hasbrouck Information Share 
 
This figure shows the logarithm of information share for CME over ICE during the Year 2010.  
 
 
 
Figures 2-4 present the daily variation of liquidity during the year, and the variations in 
the morning and afternoon. As Figure 2 shows, volume in CME demonstrates greater 
fluctuations and is higher than that on ICE. However, the quoted spread is relatively stable and is 
approximately $0.0001 (about $12.5 per contract) as shown in Figure 3. The quoted spread on 
ICE has more fluctuations and is much larger than that on CME. This implies that CME is a 
broader and liquid market. Combined with the result of Figure 1, evidence supports the notion 
that a more liquid market is also an informative market.  Figure 4 presents that the daily volatility 
of prices on CME and ICE. As seen in the figure, the volatility in both markets almost moved 
together but ICE has more volatility pikes.    
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 Figure 2 CME and ICE EURO/USD Futures Volume of Quotes
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Figure 3 CME and ICE EURO/USD Futures Quoted Spread
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C. Afternoon (1200-2400 CST) 
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B. Morning (0000-1200 CST) 
 
 
C. Afternoon (1200-2400 CST) 
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 Figure 4 CME and ICE EURO/USD Futures Price Volatility 
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Table 4 provides summary statistics of the explanatory variables in Equation (6): volume, 
quoted spread, and price volatility for CME and ICE in EURO/USD futures in twelve
interval.17 The number of observations is
the figures. The average volume on CME is at least twice higher than that on ICE for the full 
sample, mornings and afternoons. On average, the variations for volume on CME are greater 
than that on ICE except afternoons. The mean quoted spr
sample, mornings and afternoons. The average quoted spread on ICE is $0.0043 in the full 
sample. Its spread has higher fluctuations than that on CME. The quoted spread on ICE is 43, 34, 
and 53 times higher than that on CM
                                                          
17 The highest frequency in this study that information share can be estimated is the 12
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Table 4 Summary Statistics of Liquidity Variables 
 
Variables include volume, spread, and volatility of the EURO/USD traded on CME and ICE in 
the period of January 2010 to December 2010. Volume is the volume of quotes over the 12-hour 
interval. Spread is the quoted spread at the end of the 12-hour interval. Volatility is the standard 
deviation of midquotes during the 12-hour interval. 
 
  
Full sample Morning Afternoon 
  
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Panel A. CME             
Volume 23,655 13,879 34,673 10,365 12,186 4,814 
Spread ($) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Volatility 0.0023 0.0015 0.0023 0.0011 0.0022 0.0017 
       
Panel B. ICE       
Volume 9,571 6,253 12,527 6,054 6,496 4,814 
Spread ($) 0.0043 0.0149 0.0033 0.0130 0.0053 0.0166 
Volatility 0.0023 0.0022 0.0028 0.0021 0.0017 0.0022 
 
 
respectively.  As for the volatility measure, ICE has higher standard deviation of prices than 
CME. Overall, trading is heavier in the morning than those in the afternoon. The EURO/USD 
futures in CME is more liquid than that in ICE. 
Table 5 reports regression results of information share on trading characteristics 
including changes in volume, spread, and price volatility. These explanatory variables are 
relative measures; more specifically, for volume and spread, they are computed as the value of 
CME over that of ICE, and for price volatility, it is calculated as the ratio of ICE volatility to that 
of CME; a time dummy variable for the mornings is included in the regression to examine the 
time effect on the contribution to price discovery. For robustness check, various regression 
models are performed. The unrestricted model (Model 1) includes all three explanatory variables 
and the time dummy, while the restricted models (Models 2-4) include two of the three 
explanatory variables and the time dummy.  In Model 1, the estimates of change in logarithm of 
relative volume, logarithm of relative spread, and logarithm of relative volatility are all
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Table 5 Regression Analysis of Share of Price Discovery 
 
IS denotes the CME’s information share. Independent variables are volume, spread, volatility, and dummy of morning. Volume is the 
relative volume of quotes, computed as ratio of volume of quotes on CME over the volume of quotes on ICE during the k-hour 
interval. Ln denotes logarithm. ∆ represents the difference between current and previous 12-hour intervals. Spread is the ratio of 
quoted bid-ask spread on CME over the quoted bid-ask spread on ICE at the end of the k-hour interval. Volatility is the ratio of 
standard deviation of midquotes on ICE over the standard deviation of midquotes on CME during the k-hour interval. k denotes the 
12-hour interval.  D_timek is a time dummy variable; D_timek = 1 if interval k is in the morning (0000– 1200 CST); D_timek = 0 if 
interval k is in the afternoon (1200– 2400 CST). An F test is used to test the hypothesis that the parameters in the restricted model 
[model (2), (3), and (4)] are jointly zero. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. The standard errors of the estimates are computed 
based on the procedure of Newey-West (1987) to adjust for the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the regression 
errors. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The regression model is specified as follows: 
kkkkkk timeDVolatilitySpreadVolumecISIS _)ln()ln()ln()]1/(ln[ 321 +++∆+=− βββ  
  
Dependent variable: the relative contribution to price discovery  
)]1/(ln[ kk ISIS −  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Constant 4.261*** [0.000] 3.763*** [0.000]  3.826*** [0.000]  4.602*** [0.000] 
∆ln(Volume)  1.824** [0.017]    1.921** [0.013]  1.726** [0.021] 
ln(Spread) -1.636** [0.028] -1.765** [0.014]   -2.433*** [0.000] 
ln(Volatility)  0.585** [0.024]  0.541** [0.036]  0.838*** [0.000]   
D_time  2.146*** [0.010]  3.139*** [0.000]  2.238*** [0.000]  1.934*** [0.001] 
         
Adjusted R2  0.147   0.135   0.142   0.141  
F statistic   10.680***   4.381**   4.944**  
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significant at 5% level. The signs of these estimates are consistent with what theories predict.  
The results imply that when there is a 1% increase in the change of relative volume on CME to 
ICE, the relative information share of CME is expected to increase by 1.824%; a 1% increase in 
relative spread is expected to decrease CME’s relative information share by 1.636%; for a 1% 
increase in relative volatility of ICE to CME, CME’s relative information share is expected to 
increase by 0.585%. Compared to afternoons, morning sections contribute more to price 
discovery by 2.146%. All these results are consistent with the liquidity hypothesis—CME’s 
information share is greater when its volume is greater (and this occurs more often in the 
mornings), when its spread is lower, and when its relative volatility or uncertainty is lower. The 
coefficients in restricted models (Models 2-4) are significant at 5% level.  The results are 
consistent with those in the unrestricted model (Model 1). Therefore, the results are fairly 
robust.18  
For robustness check, we winsorize the data, removing observations where the values of 
any explanatory variables fall outside the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Models 1-4 are re-estimated 
using the censored data.  The estimates are consistent and significant 5% level.  The estimates 
are not reported for the sake of brevity.   
 
6. Conclusions 
This study investigates the relative contribution by Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) 
and Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) to price discovery in EURO/USD futures market using high 
frequency data in 2010. The relative contribution to price discovery is estimated using the 
information share approach of Hasbrouck (1995). The primary results indicate that CME has 
                                                          
18 An F test is performed to test whether the parameters are jointly zero in the restricted models (Models 
2-4).  The F statistics show that these three trading characteristics are jointly statistically significant.  
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higher volume and lower bid-ask spread, and dominates price discovery. On average, CME 
contributes 87% to price discovery in the EURO/USD futures market. Its contribution level is 
higher in the morning than that in the afternoon by an average of 8.4%.  
This study also examines the effect of trading characteristics including volume, spread, 
and volatility, on information share (i.e., contribution to price discovery). The results indicate 
that the higher contribution of the CME market is attributed to its high trading activity, low 
transaction costs, and lower volatility. Therefore, the findings support the liquidity hypothesis. 
As mentioned earlier, this paper compares two futures markets that are virtually identical except 
liquidity, hence it represents a cleaner test of the liquidity hypothesis. This paper is also the first 
that analyzes the information share of these two very important currency futures markets.  
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7.Appendix A EURO/USD Currency Futures Contract Specifications 
 
Trading exchange 
market 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME) 
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) 
Contract size 125,000 euro 125,000 euro 
Minimum price 
increment 
$0.00005 per euro $0.00005 per euro 
Contract month March, June, September and 
December 
March, June, September and 
December 
Last trading day 9:16 a.m. Central Time (CT) on 
the second business day 
immediately preceding the third 
Wednesday of the contract month 
(usually Monday). 
Two Business days prior to the third 
Wednesday of the expiring month.  
Trading hours  Sundays: 5:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. 
Central Standard Time (CST) 
next day. Monday – Friday: 5:00 
p.m. – 4:00 p.m. CT the next day, 
except on Friday - closes at 4:00 
p.m. and reopens Sunday at 5:00 
p.m. CST. 
 
Open on Sunday night is 5:00 PM 
CST; Pre-Open at 4:30 PM CST 
Settlement Type Physical Physical 
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